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Abstract This repon is a part of the Nordic 
BER-3 project's work to propose and harmonize 
Nordic intervention levels for countermeasures 
in case of nuclear accidents. 
This report focuses on the methodology for 
justification and optimization of protective mea-
sures in case of a reactor accident situation with a 
large release of fission products to the environ-
ment. 
The down-wind situation is very complicated. 
The dose to the exposed society is almost unpre-
dictable. The task of the radiation protection ex-
perts: To give advice to the decision makers on 
averted doses by the different actions at hand in 
the situation - is complicated. That of the deci-
sion makers is certainly more: On half of the 
society they represent, they must decide if they 
wish to follow the advices from their radiation 
protection experts or if they wish to add farther 
arguments - economical or political (or personal) 
- into their considerations before their decisions 
are taken. 
Two analysis methods available for handling 
such situations: cost-benefit analysis and mul-
ti-attribute utility analysis are described in prin-
ciple and are utilized in a case study: The im-
pacts of a Chernobyl-like accident on the Swe-
dish island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea are analy-
zed with regard to the acute consequences. 
The use of the intervention principles found in 
international guidance (IAEA 91, ICRP 91), 
which can be summarized as the principles of 
justification, optimization and avoidance of 
unacceptable doses, are described. 
How to handle more intangible factors of a 
psychological or political character is indicated. 
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1 Introduction 
In a reactor accident situation like the scenario 
described in this report, where a very large re-
lease of mixed fission products is assumed to 
have taken place, the situation for the down-wind 
radiation protection experts and the competent 
decision makers is very complicated. 
They face a situation, where the dose to the 
exposed society is almost unpredictable. The ma-
jor component of dose can be expected from in-
halation, and as the deposition dose will be 
strongly dependent on eventual rain, a forecast of 
the deposition dose component will be as uncer-
tain as the weather forecast. 
In the primary phase, where only few - if any -
information are available, the first practical indi-
cators, such as the first measurements of outdoor 
dose rates, are not directly applicable and have to 
be judged very carefully for many reasons. 
In the later phases, when the stream of infor-
mation can be overwhelming and its interpreta-
tion be complicated, the situation is however 
more stable and opens for more detailed analysis 
and dearer advices. 
The task of the experts: To give advice to the 
decision makers on averted doses by the different 
actions at hand in the situation - is complicated. 
That of the decision makers is certainly more: 
On behalf of the society they represent, they 
must decide if they wish to follow the advices 
from their radiation protection experts or if they 
wish to add further arguments - economical or 
political (or personal) - into their considerations 
before their decisions are taken. 
Such Arguments Must be Transparent to the 
Society. 
The aim of the BER-3 project is to propose and 
harmonize Nordic intervention levels for coun-
termeasures in case of nuclear accidents. 
As a step in this work and in order to promote 
the understanding of the complicated situation 
described above, this report presents a case study 
to evaluate intervention level settings by two 
methods available for handling such situations: 
cost-benefit analysis and multi-attribute utility 
analysis. 
The scenario for the case study has been 
chosen from the drill performed by the Swedish 
National Institute of Radiation Protection (SSI) 
on December 5 and 6 1990: EXERCISE SIE-
VERT. 
In this drill an accidental release following a 
hypothetical accident at the nuclear power plant 
Ignalina with a release of fission products to the 
atmosphere was assumed to have bit South-east-
ern Sweden inch the islands of Gotland and 
Oland. 
For the purpose of the present study it was 
chosen to limit the analysis to the possible im-
pact on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. 
It was also chosen to concentrate upon the 
acute protective measures and leave the longer 
term problems such as food restrictions and agri-
cultural measures. 
The Accident scenario is described in Section 
2. Accident consequences are described in Sec-
tion 3, the effects and costs of proieaive mea-
sures in Section 4. 
The purpose of this study is further to demon-
strate for Nordic conditions the use of the inter-
vention principles found in international guid-
ance (IAEA 91, ICRP 91). These can be summar-
ized as the principles of justification, optimiza-
tion and avoidance of unacceptable doses, i.e. 
doses causing deterministic effects. 
Intervention levels which are based on radia-
tion risk reduction and associated cost form the 
basis of the inputs to the decision making process 
from the radiation protection community. The 
input from the radiation protection community 
to die decision making process should be pub-
lished separately to ensure transparency to the 
public. 
An accident itself and the introduction of pro-
tective action entails health risks to the people 
affected, monetary cost and social disruption. 
The protective action, often including objectives 
which are difficult to control simultaneously, 
cannot be undertaken without careful contempla-
tion and consideration of the essential conse-
quences of decisions. Decision analysis is an ap-
propriate methodology assisting in rendering ex-
plicit and apparent all factors involved and in 
evaluating their relative importance for the deci-
sion maker. 
Different decision aiding techniques are avail-
able for the decision maker e.g. multi-attribute 
utility analysis, cost benefit analysis, interactive 
multi-objective programming and analytical 
hierarchy process. 
Section 5 gives an introductory description of 
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two quantitative decision-aiding techniques: 
cost-benefit analysis and multi-attribute utility 
analysis. 
In Section 6 is described the justification and 
optimization of protective measures found by the 
two above mentioned methods. 
Finally in Section 7 the conclusions of the pre-
sent case study are summarized. 
In this case study it was decided that a central 
alpha value, »the price of one macSv« of 20.000 
US S/manSv , should be used i the calculations 
and that sensitivity of this choice should be tes-
ted by increasing and decreasing this value by 
actors of 5 and 20 respectively. 
The numerical values far the various quanti-
ties have been chosen only for the purpose of 
dcmomstiating the methodologies. 
They should not be considered at 
mended values. 
At several occations in the process provisional 
results have been presented by the working group 
to an extended forum called the »Authority 
Group«: The working group supplied with the 
following persons from the Nordic radiation pro-
tection authorities: 
Jan Olof Snihs, SSI, Stockholm, 
Thoroif Bendsen, SIS, Oslo and 
Hugo Simonsen, SIS, Copenhagen. 
SigurSur Magnusson, Reykjavik has been in-
formed of the work. 
The discussions have led to substantial impro-
vements of the work and the working group wish 
to thank the above mentioned persons for their 
participation. 
2 Accident Scenario 
A Chernobyl-like accident is assumed to have 
happened at the nuclear power plant in Ignali-
na, Lithuania on June 16th at 20.00 including a 
fire in the core. 
The following fractions of the total core inven-
tory are assumed to have been released to the 
atmosphere by the accident: 
Noble gases 
Iodines 
Tellurium 
Cesium 
Others 
100% 
40-60% 
20% 
30% 
5% 
Weak easterly winds are prevailing in the area 
of Gotland. According to meteorological fore-
casts no fall-out can be expected before June 17th 
at about 17.00 on the island of Gotland. 
Furthermore it is expected that the passage of 
the radioactive plume will last for around 15 
hours from 17.00 to 08.00 on June 18th. A »cold 
front« passage is expected to give heavy show-
ers/thunder over Gotland during the night. 
This will deposit a large pan of the radioactive 
material in the plume as wet foil-out on the 
ground. In this report it is assumed that there 
will be no significant fallout on the Swedish 
mainland or later on on Gotland. The mainland 
contamination is set to one tenth of that on Got-
land. 
The island of Gotland has a total of 56,000 
inhabitants. The number of children below the 
age of 14 years is around 10,000. The number of 
pregnant women is expected to be around 500. 
The town of Visby on the east-coast has 20,500 
inhabitants. 
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3 Accident Consequences 
3.1 External and Internal Doses 
in the Primary Phase 
When decisions of possible protective actions are 
to be taken on June 17th between 01.00 and 15.00 
no detailed information (except weather fore-
casts) on the plume passage and the resulting 
doses is available. The average individual (effec-
tive) dose to people staying outdoors during the 
IS hours plume passage is estimated to be: 
External gamma dose from the plume 0.0S mSv 
External gamma dose from deposition 0.3 mSv 
Inhalation dose from the plume 1.5 mSv 
Total whole body dose 1.85 mSv 
The shielding factor obtained by indoor resi-
dence is 0.8 for gamma radiation from the plume 
and 0.25 for gamma radiation from the deposited 
radioactivity. The reduction factor for inhalation 
of activity by indoor residence is 0.3. 
It is assumed that people under normal cir-
cumstances are staying 2 hours outside and 13 
hours inside during the period 17.00 to 8.00. The 
average individual dose accumulated during the 
plume passage is thus 0.74 roSv for normal living 
conditions i.e. if no action is taken: (2h x (0.05 
+ 0.3 + I.5)mSv + 13h x (0.05 x 0.8 + 0.3 x 
0.25 + 1.5 x 0.3)mSVyi5h = 0.74 mSv. 
This estimate is very uncertain because only 
accident and weather forecasts are available at the 
moment of the decision. The group of experts 
estimates that the uncertainties in the estimated 
external gamma doses and the inhalation doses 
are such that the average individual dose could 
be 10 times lower with a probability of 0.3 and 10 
times higher with a probability of 0.1. The aver-
age individual dose range is vhus estimated as: 
0.074 mSv with a probability of 0.3 
0.74 mSv with a probability of 0.6 
7.4 mSv with a probability of 0.1 
The spread in individual doses for each of 
these probabilities is assumed to be less than a 
factor of 10. 
3.2 Deposition Doses in the 
Secondary Phase 
In the morning of June 18th after the plume pas-
sage the outdoor dose rate has been measured at 
different locations at the island and the above 
mentioned uncertainties in the original estimate 
has thus disappeared. The result of the survey is 
shown in Figure 1. In the N E-end of Gotland the 
measured dose rate is about 1 |iSv/h, increasing 
to about 30 »iSv/h in SW-cnd of the island. In the 
city of Visby the outdoor dose rate was measured 
to be IS - 20 |iSv/h. 
It is assumed that from the dose rate survey 
and from census data the group of experts has 
estimated that the average individual outdoor 
gamma dose accumulating over the following 
14 days will be 4 mSv. 
The dose distribution, taking into account the 
living habits on the island without shielding fac-
tors, is also estimated by the same group of ex-
perts: 
Figure 1. Plan of the survey of outdoor dose raus at 
Gotland on June 18th, morning. Exercise SIEVERT. 
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The inJiviaW dose to t0% of the population is 
less than or equal to 2 »S*, to t5% of the popu-
lation the dose is less than or equal 6 a»Sv and 
ail doses are less thaa or equal to M atSv. 
33 Deposition Doses in the Late 
Phase 
The average individual doses in the late phase, 
where die external gamma dose rate is origina-
ting from radionuclides of cesium alone, will be 
approximately 0.5 mSv/mooth in the first years 
after the accident assuming an average surface 
contamination density of 1.5 MBo/m2 of 1}7Cs). 
The protective measures considered are: 
In the primary phase sheltering daring the 
plume passage 
In the secondary phase sheltering and evacua-
In the late phase relocation, food restrictions 
and decontamination. 
4.1 Sheltering Under the Plume 
Passage 
The countermeasure considered as a possibility 
in the primary phase is sheltering of the total 
population in their homes. 
On the basis of the information given in sec-
tion 3.1 it can be calculated that when sheltering 
the dose to an average individual will be 0.S7 
mSv (0.05 x 0.8 + 0.3 x 0.25 + 1.5 x 0-3 = 
0.57 mSv) 
The individual dose mened is thus 0.17 mSv (0.74 
-0.57 = 0.17mSv) 
As mentioned earlier the uncertainty of this 
estimate is described by assigning a probability 
of 0.6 to it and probabilities of 0.3 and 0.1 to 
values that are a factor of 10 lower or higher re-
spectively. 
The probability weighted average individual dose 
averted is 0.28 mSv. 
3.4 Ingestion Doses in the Late 
Phase 
The surface contamination level of 1,7Cs is as-
sumed to be of the order of I - 2 MBq/nr. The 
concentration of 1)7Cs in milk will depend 
strongly on the season when the accident occurs. 
Peak concentrations of ,,7Cs in milk of the order 
of 2,000 - IftQO Bo/1 in the first year would be 
possible, with an average concentration over the 
year following the accident of the order of 400 -
4,000 Bo/1. 
The rammnted collective dose from inges-
tion of contaminated milk and milk prodncts 
daring the year following the accident would 
be in the range of 0004 - 0.05 miHimanSv/hg 
nulfc. 
Sheltering will cause losses to private persons 
in income and losses to industry and trade. The 
first hand approximation of monetary costs of 
sheltering can be estimated on the basis of the 
per caput Gross National Product (GNP). Direct 
and indirect monetary costs, for e.g. losses in in-
come i.e. money not earned, losses to industry, 
trade, traffic, and also damages to property are 
taken to some extent into account by using the 
GNP. The per caput GNP in Sweden is 160,000 
SEK. It is tssumed that one tenth of the GNP 
during 24 h is gathered during the night, be-
tween 17.00 and 8.00 and that 60 % of the popula-
tion are occupationally active. 
Thus the average monetary costs of sheltering is 60 
SEK/penon (160,000 SEK/(52 week/y x 5 work 
days/week x 10) = 60 SEK/person). 
The monetary cost of sheltering those working at 
night is 1,000 SEK/person (160,000/(0.6 x 52 x 5) 
= 1,000 SEK/person). 
The monetary cost of sheltering those not working 
at night is 0 SEK/person 
When the accident becomes known it will ar-
ouse concern and public anxiety. The psycholo-
gical effect of introducing countermeasures may 
be to enhance or reduce this anxiety. 
4 Effects and Costs of Protective Measures 
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42 Sheltering in the Secondary 
Phase 
One countenneasure considered as a possibility 
in the secondary phase is sheltering of all preg-
nant women (500) and all children up to the age 
of M (W.000) in their homes for 14 days. It is 
assumed that there are two children per family 
and that the mothers (5,000) will have to stay at 
home together with their children. 
On the basis of the information given in sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2 it can be calculated that the indi-
n b t / ease averted is 0.25 mSv(2h + 22h x 0.25) 
x 4mSv/24h - 4 mSv x 0.25 - 1.25 mSv • 1 n»5v 
• OJSrnSv). 
The dose mvened to each sheltered pregnant woman 
and her unborn chid is thus 0.5 nulhmanSv and the 
dose averted to each sheltered mother and her two 
children is 0.75 milkmanSv. 
For the purpose of this calculation it has been 
considered that an unborn child coresponds to a 
born child in order to calculate the tool harm. It 
is assumed that half of the mothers have employ-
ment from which they have to be absent. 
The average monetary cost of sheltering pregnant 
women will be 10,000 SEK (160,000 SEK x (2 
weeks/52 weeksVO.6 = 10,000 SEK) assuming 
that all the pregnant women are occupationally 
active. 
The average monetary cost of sheltering a mother 
and her two children will be 5,000 SEK (160,000 
SEK x (2 weeks/52 weeksyO.672 = 5,000 SEK). 
The monetary cost of sheltering a mother who is 
occupationally active and her two children is 10,000 
SEK and 0 SEK for those not occupationally active. 
4.3 Evacuation in the Secondary 
Phase 
Another countenneasure considered as a poss-
ibility in the secondary phase is evacuation of 
pregnant women (500) and children up to the age 
of 14 years (10,000) accompanied by their mo-
thers for 14 days to areas outside Gotland where 
the dose rate is 10 % of that on Gotland. 
For normal indoor residence the individual 
doses accumulated over the 14 day period follow-
ing the plume passage are calculated as follows: 
The average individual dose on the island is (2h 
+ 22h x 0.25) x 4mSv/24h = 1.25 rnSv. For an 
evacuated individual the dose is 0.1 x 1.25 mSv 
= 0.125 raSv. 
The mdmdaal Joss oserud is thus 1.12 mSx ,7.25 
mSv - 0J25 mSv » in mSv). 
The dose averted to each evacuated pregnant wo-
man and her unborn child is 2.25 uaUimanSv and 
the dost averted to each evacuated mother and her 
two children is 3.38 mUhmanSv. 
The monetary cost of transportation is set to 
200 SEK/person and other expenses to 100 SEK 
per person and day. The loss of GNP is the same 
as for sheltering on Gotland. The monetary cost 
of evacuation is thus (14 x 100 + 200) SEK -
1,600 SEK per person plus 10,000 SEK for a preg-
nant woman and 5,000 SEK for a mother and her 
two children. 
The total average monetary cost of evacuation is 
thus 11,600 SEK for a pregnant woman and 9,800 
SEK for a mother and her two children. 
The monetary cost of evacuating an occupationally 
active mother and her two children is I4J800 SEK 
and 4£00 SEK for those not occupationaUy active. 
4.4 Relocation in the Late Phase 
In the late phase where the external gamma dose 
rate is originating from radionuclides of cesium 
alone, the only countenneasure considered is re-
location of the total population. 
The average individual dose averted by this coun-
tenneasure is approximately 0.5 mSv per month in 
the first years after the accident (assumed average 
surface density 1.5 MBq/m2). 
The monetary cost of relocation is the sum of 
the average loss of GNP (if employment is lost as 
a consequence of the relocation) and the average 
monthly monetary cost for accommodation and 
food. As mentioned earlier (Section 4.1) the per 
caput GNP in Sweden is 160,000 SEK. or 13,300 
SEK/month. The monetary cost of food and ac-
commodation could be set at 2,000 Sek/month. 
The total monetary con of relocation for an average 
individual is thus 15,300 SEK/month. This amount 
will decrease with time as some are reemployed. 
4.5 Food Restrictions in the Late 
Phase 
The only food restriction considered in the late 
phase is banning of milk. On the basis of the 
information given in Section 3.4 it can be calcu-
lated that the committed collective dose from inges-
tion of contaminated milk during the year following 
the accident will be in the range of 0.006-0.05 milli-
manSv/kg milk which could be averted if the conta-
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miaated milk produced at Gotland was removed 
from human consumption. 
Tkt monetary cost is assumed tø he 7 SEJVkg 
anil. 
4.6 Decontamination in the Late 
Phase 
Experiments with decontamination of urban sur-
faces and experience from tbe Chernobyl acci-
5.1 Introduction 
In situations where radiation protection is an is-
sue, decision aiding techniques can be used to 
assist in justifying the action and optimizing the 
protection by selecting tbe best option between a 
number of possible different actions. Two of 
these techniques will be dealt with here, namely 
extended cost-benefit analysis and multi-attri-
bute utility analysis. The purpose is to highlight 
the connexion between the two methods includ-
ing simibritics and differences. 
The factors determining tbe outcome of an 
analysis are: 
1) Tbe specification of the radiological protec-
tion factors such as dose averted (benefit) and 
the monetary cost incurred by intervention, 
and 
2) Tbe criteria to be used in tbe analysis such as 
value functions describing the psychological va-
luation of different levels of the radiation pro-
tection factors (onrifetcs), *nd veigktmg factors 
determining the value ratios between them. 
It is worth noting that the outcome of an 
analysis is not influenced by the decision-aiding 
technique used, as long as the above mentioned 
factors are not changed. 
It is important to recognize that decision aid-
ing techniques are not intended to replace tbe 
role and judgement of a decision maker. The ob-
jective is to find a balanced action with the assist-
ance of an analysis. 
It is a way to help the decision maker to think 
more clearly about his problem and to bring him 
further insight and understanding. 
dent indicate that a realistic large scale reduction 
factor is of the order of 2. If it is assumed that a 
large scale decontamination campaign can be car-
ried out, tkt tndmdmal external Jose aoerttd in a 
lifetime of 70 yean vxll be of tkt order of 60 mSv per 
person aver fan pertod-
Cost euimmui for iecomammanm Awe ranted be-
nveenljDOO S and 10,000 S per person depending on 
tbe population density in the area to be deconta-
minated. 1 US S has been set to 7 SEK. 
Decision making requires trade offs to be 
made between the harmful and beneficial conse-
quences of every possible solution. Either intuit-
ively or explicitly, tbe decision maker must iden-
tify tbe attributs relevant to the decision, and 
value tbe consequences of the available options 
against them. Tbe advantage of performing the 
analysis explicitly, using formal techniques, is 
that the process is clearly structured and impor-
tant factors are less likely to be overlooked. 
5.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The oldest form of decision analysis in radiation 
protection is the simple cost-benefit analysis 
where only dose averted and costs are considered. 
These attributes are described by linear valne 
functions, e.g. it is assumed that a certain dose 
averted has always the same value ii respective of 
the dose level (uuide tbe stochastic effects range) 
and a dollar spent has always the same value irre-
spective of the total amount spent. Tbe ratio be-
tween these attributes is fixed by a simple 
weighting facto:, usually called a, a constant 
monetary value assigned to an averted dose of 
onemanSv. 
Tbe optimum option is then simply the one 
where the difference between the values of the 
dose averted (a x dose) and tbe cost has the 
largest positive value. 
In more complex situations other factors can of 
course be included in the analysis such as anxie-
ty, reassurance or social disruption caused direct-
ly by the countermcasurcs. This assumes that va-
lue functions and weighting factors can be as-
signed by reasoning, consensus or other suitable 
methods (extended cost-benefit analysis). The value 
5 Quantitative Decision-Aiding Techniques 
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functions have to be independent but they need 
not be linear and will normally have a curvature 
of the type described below in Section 5-4. 
53 Multi-Attribute Utility 
Analysis 
Multi-attribute utility analysis is intended for 
aiding complex decision making, which involves 
both quantifiable and less quantifiable factors. 
The analysis begins with the identification of the 
set o( opiums, or available solutions to the prob-
lem. For example in emergency planning, a set of 
options might be the various intervention levels 
at which a protective measure should be adopted 
- including the option not intervening. Options 
are compared by evaluating their performance 
with reference to a number of factors, »miomtts, 
which are relevant to the decision. When deci-
ding upon the optimum intervention level for a 
protective measure, appropriate attributes might 
include dose saved, disruption, risk from the pro-
tective measure, monetary cost and reassurance 
provided by the protective measure. Some of 
these attributes, such as dose saved, are directly 
quantifiable, whilst others, such as reassurance, 
are more subjective. In a multi- attribute utility 
analysis the performances of competing options 
on an attribute are assessed relative to each other, 
rather than being converted into a universal mea-
sure (eg. currency)- Subjective aims are thus 
more easily encompassed, since relative rather 
than absolute performances are used. 
5.4 Value Functions 
A sumr function msocmus « smh/ecme now to **y 
objective fMnmy mar amy if gmned or lost. 
The value function for gains is normally con-
cave downward so that an extra unit gained adds 
less to the total subjective gain than the preced-
ing one. It becomes progressively flatter as the 
gain increases as cxamplined in Figure 2. This is 
compatible with the common impression that the 
difference between a gain of MO $ and one of 200 
$ is more outstanding than the difference be-
tween a gain of U00 $ and one of 1^00 $. Such a 
value function implies a risk overse mande. Le. a 
ceruinom^onnt is preferred wmtmnkUvukmneqnal 
or greater mathematical expectation. 
The value function for fosses is normally con-
vex daamuard (the objective foss and its subjec-
tive value are both negative) so that an extra unit 
lost adds less to the total subjective loss than the 
preceding one. This is compatible with the com-
mon impression that the difference between a 
loss of 100 S and one of 200 $ is more outstanding 
than the difference between a foss of MOO S and 
one of 1,200 $. 
Figmn2. 
5 10 
Averted dose (mSv) 
15 
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Such a value fuactxea implies a risk setting 
amntdt, i.e. a certain outcome is rejected in fa-
vour of a gamble with an equal or lower mathe-
matical expectation. If the value function for los-
ses b delineated numerically it resembles the va-
lue function for gains although they are not iden-
tical. 
Ii is common that øVr swbftttii* vmhe of 35 % of 
m amomnt tm be fwnwW km kalf the smk/ectut vmlme 
•/mat mmma*. For example the subjective value 
of a gain of 35 $ is commonly felt to be half the 
subjective value of a fain of MO $ and 350 S half 
the value of 1,000$. 
It can be shown mathematically that the value 
function for an individual who follows this 35 % 
proportionality is a power function with an expo-
nent of approximately 2/3. 
Fm losses it is common duv dir nmyettioe (mega-
tm) valne of am iwimt to be løst is 40 % of tkt 
mbjetrist valne of dmm amomnt. For example the 
subjective value of a loss of 40 $ is commonly felt 
to be half the subjective value of a loss of MO S 
and a loss of 400 S half the value of M»0 $. The 
corresponding power function has an exponent of 
approximately 3/4. 
T V power function model breaks down when 
the gains or losses increase out of proportion to 
the individual's normal economic capacity. For 
extremely large gains, the value function be-
comes almost flat as the individual becomes in-
different to the choke between enormous gains. 
For losses, the value function becomes very steep 
(changes from risk search to risk averseness) 
when possible losses become so large that they 
would ruin the individual. 
Individuals differ naturally in their attitudes 
towards risks and towards money and the value 
functions presented here are only a summary of 
the attitudes of the raajority of people, not a 
scientific law. 
Radiation protection measures affecting the 
general population have, at the end of the day, to 
be paid for by this population, and the optimum 
solution is thus dependent on the population's 
wMmgnris to pay for protection or expressed in 
another way: Dependent on the value functions 
corresponding to the preferences of that popula-
tion. 
5.5 Utility Functions 
While, in extended cost-ccnefh analysis value 
functions are used directly and weighting (actors 
between radiation protection factors (or attri-
butes) art ratios between units of the various at-
tributes, this is different in multi-attribute utility 
decision analysis. In multi-attribute utility analy-
sis, scores (or utilities) are assessed in terms of 
how valued, or desirable, each attribute value is 
to the decision maker in order that options may 
be compared. Utility is measured on a scale from 
0 (worst performance) to 1 (best performance). 
For some attributes such as averted dose (a 
desirable attribute), a high score (utility or sub-
jective value) implies a high attribute value. For 
others such as monetary cost (an undesirable at-
tribute), it is the lowest score which implies the 
highest attribute value. The relationship between 
a score and its attribute value is not always linear, 
since the subjective value (score or partial utility) 
associated with a unit on the attribute scale may 
change according to the location upon the scale 
at which the unit lies. Variation in preference 
along a particular scale, or partial unlay fmnaions, 
are dependent of the individual or group in ques-
tion and of the circumstances. 
/ • Mfihty analysis dm value function of am attribute 
is transformed to m partial utility function. As an 
example Figure 3 shows the connection between 
a partial utility function and the corresponding 
value function for avened dose (a desirable attri-
bute) with the avened dose on the abscissa and 
the subjective value (subjective benefit, partial 
utility or score) in arbitrary units on the ordi-
nate. If the lowest avened dose resulting from 
any of the options of intervention is 5 mSv and 
the higbesi avened dose that result from any of 
the options is 10 mSv, then 5 mSv is assigned a 
utility of 0 and 10 mSv a utility of I and the 
»range« is (10 - 5) « 5 mSv - as shown on the 
bold drawn pan of Figure 3. This figure shows 
the close connection between ordinary value 
functions and partial utility functions. The par-
tial utility function for desirable attributes coin-
cides with the value function between the abcis-
sae S and 10 (the »range«). 
The partial utility pan of the figure: is redrawn 
in Figure 4a. If the abcissa had not been a desir-
able attribute (avened dose) as in Figure 4a but 
an undesirable one, e j . received dose, then the 
option giving the highest received dose would be 
assigned a partial utility of 0 and the lowest re-
ceived dose a panial utility oi1- The panial util-
ity function would have had an appearance as 
shown in Figure 4b (a mirror image of the value 
function around a horizontal line). 
For gains or desirable attributes (Figure 4a) 
the utility function is concave downward. This 
12 Ris#-R-641(EN) 
y 
u
n
it
s) 
bi
tr
ar
 
je 
(a
r
 
iv
e 
v
a
li 
Su
bj
ec
t 
o
 
• 
— • - H f-
1 
*•* 
a 
VS 
— 1 — I 
1 
Attribute scale 
»lue function 
1 1 1—1—1 1-
Partial utility 
function for 
desirable 
attributes 
—1—1 1 1 i » 
5 10 
Averted dose (mSv) 
15 
Figure 3. 
Figure 4a. Figure 4b. 
Undesirable 
attributes 
Partial utility 
function for 
desirable 
attributes 
Attribute scale Attribute scale 
signifies a risk averse attitude. For loses or unde-
sirable attributes (Figure 4b) the utility function 
is concave upward. This signifies a risk seeking 
attitude. 
The utility functions can be assessed e.g. by 
asking the decision maker for his midpoint pre-
ference between the lowest and highest attribute 
abscissae. This could e.g. be at 40 % of the differ-
ence. The corresponding utility would be 0.S giv-
ing one point on the utility curve. More points 
can be assessed by asking the decision maker for 
his midpoint preferences between the abscissae 0 
and 40 % and between 40 % and 100 % and so on. 
5.6 Weighting Factors in Utility 
Analysis 
The overall performance of each option is mea-
sured in terms of total utility, achieved by weigh-
ing and summing the values associated with each 
attribute. Weights reflect not only the intrinsic 
importance of the attribute to the decision maker 
(eg. health effects may be regarded as inherently 
more important than monetary costs) but also the 
length of the scale upon which it has been mea-
sured. Thus if there is little difference between 
the attribute values resulting from the available 
options, then the scale is short, whereas if there 
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are considerable differences then the scale is long 
and the weight assigned correspondingly higher. 
In utility analysis the weighting factors (or scal-
ing constants) are proportional to the the value 
difference over the ranges of attributes (the value 
coresponding to a utility of 1 minus the value 
corresponding to a utility of 0). If e.g. wx is the 
weighting factor for cost and ws the weighting 
factor for dose then: 
wx /(value of difference in cost 
between utilities 0 and 1) = 
ws/(alpha x value of difference in dose 
between utilities 1 and 0). 
Usually the weighting factors are normalized 
so that Xw; = 1. 
The weighting factors can be determined e.g. 
by so-called swing weighting: 
For two particular options A and B, the deci-
sion maker is asked to imagine that all the attri-
butes, except attribute x and attribute y, have the 
same partial utility for the two options. 
He is further asked to imagine that attribute x 
has a partial utility of 1 and attribute y a partial 
utility of 0 for option A, and that for option B it 
is vice versa. 
If he now prefers option A for option B then to 
him obviously wx > wy. Suppose now that for 
option B, the size of attribute x is lowered so 
much that the the decision maker is indifferent 
between the two options and that this size is 0.6x. 
Then Wy/wx = 0.6. 
If the process is repeated for other pairs of 
options, a complete set of weighting factors can 
be derived. 
5.7 Total Utility of Options 
For each option, the partial utilities correspond-
ing to the abscissae of all the attributes are deter-
mined by the corresponding utility functions. 
These partial utilities are each multiplied by the 
appropriate weighting factor. The sum of these 
products is called the total utilities of the options. 
The numerical values of the total utilities pro-
vides a ranking order of the options. The option 
with the highest utility is the optimal one accord-
ing to the decision makers preferences. 
This procedure presupposes that the partial 
utility functions are all independent. 
When the partial utility functions and the 
weighting factors are fixed, it is easy to derive the 
value functions and the unit weighting factors 
that could be used in an extended cost-benefit 
analysis. This can lead to the optimal option 
without the use of total utilities but with the 
same result with respect to ranking. 
The difference would of course be, that in ex-
tended cost-benefit analysis an attempt would be 
made to replace the preferences of the decision 
maker by more common »objective« criteria. Per-
haps these would be e.g. value functions of the 
power function type with exponents of 2/3 and 
3/4 for gains and losses, respectively, which are 
typical for the majority of the general population. 
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6 Optimization of Protective Measures 
6.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
A Summary of Annex I 
International guidance on intervention comprise 
the principles of justification/optimization as ba-
sis for intervention in de facto situations, ie. si-
tuations where the radiation source already is 
present in the environment. 
Inteiventk.i. is justified when the introduc-
tion of proiectiv'r measures will achieve more 
good than harm. T;;c 'evel at which the interven-
tion is introduced, asd the level at which it is 
later withdrawn, shouU be optimised so the in-
tervention will produce the maximum benefit, ie. 
do the most good. 
For a protective measure which is spread over 
time like sheltering, evacuation and relocation, 
the intervention level of dose (and the corre-
sponding derived intervention level) for opti-
mum protection is determined by the cost of the 
protective measure per unit time, a, and the mon-
etary value of the unit collective dose, a. The 
optimum protection would be obtained if die 
protective measure is introduced at a level where 
the effective individual dose per unit time ex-
ceeds die value, Eop„ and is terminated when the 
effective dose per unit time drops below this va-
lue. The Intervention Level (IL), Éopt, will be: 
IL = Éopt = i . (1) 
a 
For contaminated foodstuffs, the Intervention 
Level expressed as activity concentration in the 
foodstuff, C, can be calculated from the cost per 
unit mass of the foodstuff, b, and the monetary 
value of the unit collective dose, a, as: 
IL = Copi = A (2) 
a t 
where e is the committed dose per unit activity 
ingested. 
In the optimization calculations three different 
values of a have been used: 
1,000 $/raanSv, 20,000 $/manSv and 
100,000 $/manSv. 
The upper value has been included because the 
Nordic radiation protection Authorities have ad-
vocated that »up to 100,000 $ would be a reason-
able value to spend for reducing the collective 
dose by 1 manSv«. 
Sheltering in the Primary Phase 
The averted individual doses by sheltering in the 
primary phase arc 0.17 mSv/15 h. The optimized 
ILs for sheltering in the primary phase have been 
calculated to be in the range of 0.1 • 150 mSv/15 
h, depending on the sheltering scenario and the 
monetary value of a. Sheltering of the total popu-
lation is therefore justified only for the upper 
value of a for which the averted dose of 0.17 
mSv/15 h > IL. 
Sheltering in the Secondary Phase 
The averted individual doses by sheltering in the 
secondary phase are 0.25 mSv/14 d. The opti-
mized ILs for sheltering in the secondary phase 
(14 days) have been calculated to be in the range 
of 7 -1,500 mSv/14 d, depending on the shelter-
ing scenario and the monetary value of a. Shel-
tering is therefore not justified for any i ' the 
considered a-values because the averted dose of 
0.25 mSv/14 d < IL. 
Evacuation in the Secondary Phase 
The averted individual doses by evacuation in 
the secondary phase are 1.12 mSv/14 d. The opti-
mized ILs for evacuation in the secondary phase 
have been calculated to be in the range of 7 -
2,000 mSv/14 d, depending on the evacuation 
scenario and the monetary value of a. Evacuation 
is therefore not justified for any of the considered 
a-values because the averted dose of 1.12 mSv/14 d 
<IL. 
Relocation in the Long-Term Phase 
The averted individual doses by relocation in the 
long-term phase are 0.5 mSv/month The opti-
mized ILs for relocation (and resettlement) in 
the long-term phase have been calculated for the 
three a-values to be in the range of 3 - 2,000 
m$v/month, depending on the relocation scen-
ario and the monetary value of a. 
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Relocation is therefore not justified for any of 
the considered a-values because the averted dose 
of 0.5 mSv/month < IL. 
Milk Restrictions 
The averted collective committed dose by milk 
restrictions the first year after theaccident is as-
sumed to be 0.02 millimanSv/kg milk, corre-
sponding to an activity concentration of 137Cs of 
1,600 Bq/kg. The optimized ILs for the introduc-
tion (and withdrawal) of protective measures in 
form of removing the milk from human con-
sumption have been calculated to be in the range 
of 800 - 80,000 Bq/kg, depending on the mon-
etary value of a. 
Milk restriction is therefore justified only for the 
upper value of a for which the cesium concentra-
tion in milk of 1,600 Bq/kg > IL. 
In summary, the individual doses that could be 
averted are of a magnitude that in most cases would 
not justify protective measures. Furthermore, the aver-
ted doses are below or close to the lower level of the 
intervention level range given in the indicative gui-
dance from the IAEA. According to the IAEA, it 
would be erroneous to select arbitrarily values from 
the bottom of the ranges given in the guidelines. Given 
the disruptive character of the protective measures of 
sheltering, evacuation and relocation, the optimum 
level for intervention for these measures would prob-
ably fall outside the IAEA ranges at the top level. 
6.2 Multi-Attribute Utility 
Analysis 
A Summary of Annex II 
The basic principles of radiation protection are 
based on the justification and optimization of 
protective actions. The decision analysis, al-
though closely enrvined with these principles, 
does not interpret the mults with this termino-
logy. The aim of decision analysis is to find the 
best solution to a problem based on the rational-
ity of the decision makers). However, the result 
of decision analysis can be translated to corre-
spond to the basic principles of radiation protec-
tion. 
At the beginning of a decision analysis all feas-
ible protective actions are defined, including the 
action of doing nothing - the acceptance of status 
quo. It is the existing situation which forms the 
basis to which protective actions are compared 
when they are assessed as justified or not - with 
respect to the preferences of society represented 
by a decision maker. The preferences and trade-
offs - the judgemental inputs to analysis - form 
the basis for justification. A protective action is 
justified if the values connected to it are grater 
than those of no-action. 
The optimization of the intervention is 
achieved by ranking all feasible actions defined, 
for example, by various intervention levels. The 
action with the highest ranking will produce the 
maximum benefit. In optimization it is thus as-
sumed that all actions and attributes are defined 
at the beginning of an analysis. In practice, how-
ever, it is not possible to define all actions before 
making some preliminary numerical assessments 
and running through some rough calculation to 
gain a feeling for what numbers are important 
and require refined assessment. The optimiza-
tion of intervention means this iterative process 
of maximization of protection in all its essentials. 
The setting of an intervention level in an acci-
dent situation or in planning of the intervention 
levels is seldom a purely mathematical problem. 
The contamination level will affect the relative 
importance of factors and preferences of a deci-
sion maker. The assessment of intervention le-
vels with a scenario and a contamination level 
close to trigger the implementation of protective 
action helps to avoid biases and amplifies the 
feeling of which factors that are important. 
All important attributes and feasible actions 
should be included in the analysis. Well defined 
attributes facilitate the process of ensuring that 
the final set of attributes actually captures all the 
relevant and useful values. In applications of de-
cision analysis Winterfeldt and Edwards (Wi86) 
have often found themselves suggesting to deci-
sion makers, for example, that the political bran-
ches of a decision should be considered in eva-
luating its consequences. In their experience, 'de-
cision makers too often ignore this slippery issue 
and are bitten by it after the decision is made'. 
Also they encourage decision makers to be open 
and explicit about selfish values and motives. 'In 
almost all applications decision makers benefited 
from clarification of all their values'. 
The most important factor affecting the deci-
sion of a protective action in analyses performed 
is the trade-off value (the a-value) between a dose 
averted and the monetary costs of an action. The 
large range of the intervention level is due to the 
range of the trade-off value. An increase in un-
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demanding of how to assess the trade-offs be-
tween all attributes will reduce the range of inter-
vention levels and will make other factors, e.g. 
the shape of a utility function, more important in 
a decision. 
The Primary Phase 
In the primary phase the intervention level is 3.7 
mSv for sheltering the whole population given as 
the outside dose meter reading accumulated dur-
ing 15 hours. Calculations are based on the cen-
tral trade-off value of 140 000 SEK/manSv. The 
range of the intervention level corresponding to 
the range of the a-value - of 7,000 - 700,000 
SEK/manSv is 0.2 - 20 mSv. Sheltering is justi-
fied at the dose level of 1.85 mSv if the a-value is 
higher than 280 000 SEK/manSv. 
The Secondary Phase 
In the secondary phase sheltering or evacuation 
is not justified within the given range of the 
trade-off value. The intervention level for eva-
cuation is 80 mSv using the central a-value of 140 
SEK/mSv. The range of the intervention level is 
4 - 400 mSv, corresponding to the range of the 
a-value between dose and cost. 
Milk Restrictions 
Withdrawing the milk from consumption is jus-
tified within the given range of the a-value. The 
intervention level, given as the mean concentra-
tion of 137Cs, is 350 Bq/1 during the first year after 
the accident. The intervention level is 200 Bq/1 in 
the first month after the accident given as the 
mean concentration of 137Cs during the first 
month. The range of the intervention level corre-
sponding to the range of a-value is 20 - 2000 Bq/1 
in the first year, and 10 - 1000 Bq/1 in the first 
month. 
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7 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this study has been to de-
monstrate the setting of intervention levels to be 
used in nuclear accident situations. As back-
ground for selecting appropriate types of coun-
termeasures the scenario »Exercise Sievert« has 
been chosen as a case study. 
In order to obtain the necessary background 
for the formulation of an intervention strategy 
not only the total population as such should be 
considered, but the total population should be 
split into smaller subgroups well defined with 
regards to a.o. radiation sensitivity and costs. In 
this analysis the society was split into the group* 
mentioned below, mainly caused by the dififering 
costs of the countermeasures as applied in the 
different population groups. The grouping con-
sidered is described in Section 4. 
Two disparate analysis methods have been 
used: cost-benefit analysis and multi-attribute 
utility analysis. 
and a collective averted dose of: 
0.02 millimanSv/fcgfor banning milk (in the 
case of ,,7Cs this corre-
sponds to a concentration 
of 4 kBq/kg except for 
pregnant women where 
the corresponding concen-
tration is 2 kBq/kg). 
In the detailed cost-benefit calculations in An-
nex I three a-values are used. The central a-value 
is 20,000 US VmanSv, while the upper and lower 
values, used to test tb» sensivny of the calcula-
tions, are a-values 20 times lower and S times 
higher reti>«ctively. 
The table in the Annex I, summarizing the 
results of the justification/optimization calcula-
tions for the different protective measures is re-
peated here: 
7.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The cost-benefit analysis has then shown, that it 
is justified and optimized to avert the following 
doses for an a-value of 20,000 $/manSv: 
An individual averted dose of: 
0.4 mSv/15 h for sheltering the total popula-
tion in the primary phase 
7 mSv/15 h for sheltering those working at 
night 
70 mSv/14 d for sheltering pregnant women 
40mSv/14d for sheltering mothers + 
children 
70mSv/14d for sheltering mothers work-
ing at night + children 
80mSv/14d for evacuating pregnant wo-
men 
70mSv/14d for evacuating all mothers + 
children 
100mSv/14d for evacuating mothers occu-
pationally active + children 
30 mSv/14 d for evacuating mothers not oc-
cupationally active + children 
100 mSv/month for relocating the total popula-
tion in the late phase 
i M i r m l i « « L c v t b tor C a m H S i n v r t G l l M d 
S M l r r i m ; 
mnmrnrf p k M l 
t a u l 
TfcMt working 
S I M I tering 
M i M i d w y phm» 
Kegnanc 
Allflwchcn 
Mdtkc i r 
cUdrcn 
M « t k t n working 
• I oigbf tad 
tkfi« ckridrm 
£v ic»ac i * f i 
M f n a t r y pfcMc 
P n g u n t 
A i l m r t k m 
» 4 Ikrir 
cbddrm 
OcnpatMui r r 
Kt iw/ imtbcn 
mi ifcftr dtifdmi 
NM-e t tsMtmMl r r 
*rti«v moifcrn 
tmi Iknr rkiWrm 
l U k K M w n 
U u p k * M 
"Wi thml k » 
of jab 
M i l k r« * ( r i c ( i »M 
U U ph«M 
f o u l 
Mowlalion 
A n r t H s o w 
017 rnS. / IS k 
0.17 mSi/M k 
A W T I A M I tMsat 
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A n r M t o t 
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OS m S T / i m i h 
A v c r M d M w 
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I t 
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0.4 miJlli k 
• 1 a t i « / l 3 k 
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n. 
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« * mi-IH 4 
11«S</14 • 
I J O O m S . / U d 
70 mSr/14 i 
. 4 m 5 . ) l 4 d 
ft. 
I.S00 mSr/14 d 
00 m 5 . / l 4 d 
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7 0 m S . / 1 4 d 
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2 J 0 0 m J » / l 4 d 
100 mS* / l 4 4 
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» m S V / u d 
7 m 5 « / l 4 r f 
a 
MOO n S r / i m M k 
i t t a S V / M M i k 
V msWiMMk 
100 nOr /n iMik 
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ft ' 
W k B W k f 
olUbf 
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J M I M M B T M 
— l i m ' l i d 
• M j v j I d W 
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» 1 j u l i l l l l 
M l JWtinM 
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It is noted that the IL-values depend on the 
chosen a-value and die local cost level only - bat 
not on the accident scenario. 
Applying these a-values to the scenario at 
hand gives the result that: 
Intervention is not justified except for the 
highest a-value (100,000 US $/manSv) and then 
only for: 
Sheltering in the primary phase and milk 
banning. 
7.2 Multi-Attribute Utility 
Analysis 
Applying multi-attribute utility analysis to the 
scenario yields the same results with respect to 
the choice of countenneasures and their justifi-
cation as the cost-benefit analysis. 
This is a general rule that applies as long as 
the same value functions (or utility functions and 
weighting factors) are used. 
For the sake of completeness it should be men-
tioned, that different costs for one kg of milk 
have been used in the two methods: 7 SEK/kg in 
the cost-benefit analysis and 3 SEK/kg (produc-
tion cost) in the multi-attribute utility analysis. 
The essential aim of a decision analysis is to 
help the decision maker to think more clearly 
about the problems and to bring him funher in-
sight and understanding. In the light of that un-
derstanding the decision maker must make his 
choice. 
In group decisions - in social choices - at least 
in a democracy, the decision maker(s) represents 
the population - on behalf of which the decision 
is made - and its preferences, which are expected 
to be considered in a fair and just process. 
One of the aims of decision analysis is to struc-
ture the problem such mat important aspects are 
not overlooked. This is often done by arranging a 
so-called decision conference, where all aspects of 
the problem are discussed freely and informally. 
Such a decision conference has not been arranged 
in connection with the present study. 
In the present analysis only tangible attributes 
such as averted radiation doses and the monetary 
costs of countermeasures have had an influence 
on the result. Where more intangible factors of a 
psychological or political character are signifi-
cant, the resulting recommended countermea-
sures - with and without these factors taken into 
account - should be made public in order to en-
sure transparency to the population. 
How to tackle such factors is indicated in Ap-
pendix II. 
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ANNEX I. Cost Benefit Analysis 
by 
Per Hedemann Jensen 
1 Introduction 
A case study of intervention level setting following a hypothetical accident at the 
nuclear power plant Ignalina in Lithuania with a release of fission products to 
the atmosphere has been made. Due to easterly winds, the plume will pass the 
island of Gotland for around 15 hours, and heavy shov ers will cause ground con-
tamination of fission products by wet deposition. The purpose of the study is to 
demonstrate for Nordic conditions the use of the intervention principles found in 
international guidance [1,2]. These can be summarised as the principles of justi-
fication, optimization and below deterministic effects. 
Intervention Levels (ILs) which are based on radiation risk reduction and mon-
etary costs form the basis for the inputs to the decision making process from the 
radiation protection community. The input from the radiation protection com-
munity to the decision making process should be published separately to ensure 
transparency to the public. Other factors than those of strictly radiological protec-
tion nature will, however, enter the decision making process. These other factors 
will often have greater weight than the radiological protection factors but they 
are the sole responsibility of the decision maker and should not emerge from the 
radiation protection community. 
2 Protective Measures and Doses 
Averted 
2.1 Sheltering in the Primary Phase 
If the people are sheltered in their homes during the plume passage, the external 
and the internal doses will be reduced because of the protective effect of the build-
ings. The reduction of the average individual dose by sheltering, ie. the average 
individual dose averted, has been calculated to be: 
Averted individual dose: 0.17 mSv/15 h 
The monetary cost has been estimated to be 60 SEK in average per person sum-
ming up to 2.8 Million SEK for the whole population. The average cost of shelter-
ing only those working at night has been estimated to be 1,000 SEK per person. 
2.2 Sheltering in the Secondary Phase 
In the secondary phase of 14 days, three different scenarios of sheltering have 
been considered. Firstly, all pregnant women are sheltered in their homes for 14 
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days. Secondly, all mothers and children are sheltered. Thirdly, only those mothers 
working at night and their children are sheltered. 
2.2.1. Sheltering of Pregnant Women 
The average individual dose averted by sheltering for a period of 14 days has 
been calculated to be: 
Averted individual dose: 0.25 mSv/14 d 
The average monetary costs of sheltering 500 pregnant women have been esti-
mated to 10,000 SEK/person summing up to be 5 Million SEK. assuming that all 
pregnant women are occupatRmally active. 
2.2.2. Sheltering of all Mothers and Children 
The average individual dose averted by sheltering all mothers and their two chil-
dren below the age of 14 years (15,000 persons) has been calculated to be: 
Averted individual dose: 3 x 0.25 mSv/14 d 
The monetary costs have been estimated to be 5.000 SEK per mother plus children, 
assuming that half of the mothers have normal work from which they have to be 
absent. The total cost will thus be 25 Million SEK. 
2.2.3. Sheltering of Mothers Working at Night and Their Children 
The average individual dose averted by sheltering mothers working at night and 
their two children has been calculated to be. 
Averted individual dose: 3 x 0.25 mSv/14 d 
The monetary costs of sheltering mothers who are working at night have been 
estimated to be 1,000 SEK/person. 
2.3 Evacuation in the Secondary Phase 
Four different evacuation scenarios have been considered. Firstly, all pregnant 
women are evacuated for a period of 14 days to areas where the dose rate is 10% 
of the dose rate at Gotland. Secondly, all mothers and their children below the -
age of 14 years are evacuated. Thirdly, only those mothers occupationally active 
and their children are evacuated. Fourthly, only mothers not occupationally active 
and their children are evacuated. 
The average individual dose averted by evacuation for 14 days has been calcu-
lated to be: 
Averted individual dose: 1.12 mSv/14 d 
The average monetary costs of evacuation have been estimated to be 
11,600 SEK/person for pregnant women, 9,800 SEK/mother+2 children, 
14,800 SEK/mother+2 children for occupationally active mothers, and 4.800 
SEK/mother+2 children for non-occupationally active mothers. 
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2.4 Relocation in the Long-Term Phase 
The average individual doses averted by relocation in the long-term phase, where 
the external -vdose rate is originating alone from radionuclides of cesium, will 
be approximately 0.5 mSv/month in the first years after the accident (assumed 
surface contamination density with l3'Cs of 1.5 MBq/irr) 
The monetary costs of relocation have two major components: the averagt- 'oss 
of income (if employment is lost as a consequence of the relocation) and the 
average monthly cost for accomodation and other costs such as deterioration of 
property etc. The monthly cost of food and accomodation and other costs could 
cautiously be set to 2.000 SEK/month/person [3j. If the job is lost as a result 
of the relocation the average cost has been taken to be 1/12 of the GNP per 
capita, corresponding to 13.300 SEK/month. This cost will decrease with time 
when people are reemployed. 
2.5 Milk Restrictions 
The surface contamination level of I3"Cs is assumed to be of the order of J - 2 
MBq/m5. The concentration of 13'Cs in milk will depend strongly on the time 
of year when the accident occurs. Peak concentrations in milk of l3'Cs of the 
order of 2.000 - 8,000 Bq-/~' in the first year would be possible, with an average 
concentration over the the year following the accident of the order of 400 - 4,000 
Bq-r1 . 
The committed collective dose from ingestion of contaminated milk and milk 
products during the year following the accident would be in the range of 0.006-
0.05 manmSv/kg milk which could be averted, if the contaminated milk produced 
at Gotland was removed from human consumption. The cost is assumed to be 7 
SEK/kg milk/milk product [3]. 
3 Justification and Optimization 
of Protective Measures 
There has been much confusion over the role of dose limits in the establishment 
of intervention following an accident. Several factors have contributed to this con-
fusion, not least the numerically equality between some of the intervention levels 
of dose proposed and the annual dose limits. The aims of intervention levels are 
quite different from those of dose limits. The dose limits recommended by the 
ICRP are set for controlling increases of radiation exposure for practices. In-
tervention levels relate specifically to protective measures to decrease existing 
radiation exposure. 
The dose averted by the protective measures is the relevant quantity for judging 
the radiological benefits of these measures and this quantity should be used as the 
basis for expressing quantitative intervention criteria. 
3.1 Application of Basic Justification/Optimization 
Principles 
International guidance on intervention [1,2] comprise the principles of justification 
and optimization as basis for intervention in de facto situations, ie. situations 
where the radiation source already is present in the environment. 
Intervention is justified when the introduction of protective measures will 
Risø-R-641(EN) 23 
achieve more guud tluui liana. The level at which the intervention »s introduced, 
and the level at which it is later withdrawn, should be optimised so the interven-
tion will produce the maximum benefit, ie. do the must good. Although these two 
principles of justification and optimization are stated separately, it is necessary 
to consider them together when reaching a decision on intervention. 
The general case is likely to be that there is a range of protective measures 
that would give more good than harm, so that intervention is justified for all 
these measures, with the selection of the most appropriate one depending on the 
particular circumstances. 
In addition, all possible effort should be made to prevent deterministic health 
effects. For the accident scenario under consideration such effects are not possible 
at the given dose levels including radiation induced malfunctions of the embryo 
which have a threshold of about 0.1 Gy [2]. 
The net benefit. B. achieved by a protective measure can be expressed as: 
B = A V - A (1) 
where 
AV is the cost equivalent of the averted collective dose AS 
X is the monetary cost of implementing the protective measure 
The cost equivalent of the averted dose is calculated from the monetary value 
assigned to the unit collective dose, a: 
AV = a AS (2) 
The maximum net benefit can be found by an optimization process which can be 
conceptualized in simple differential cost-benefit terms: 
dB(J) _ dAV(J) , dA(7) „ 
~d7~ " ~~dT~ + ~~dT ~ ° (3) 
where / is the intervention level. At the optimum point, i.e. where the net benefit B 
is maximum (and positive), the intervention level /. expressed in terms of averted 
dose, would under the given circumstances correspond to an action level above 
which the protective measure should be introduced and below which it should 
not. 
For a protective measure which is spread over time like sheltering, evacuation 
and relocation, the intervention level of dose per unit time (and the corresponding 
derived intervention level) for optimum protection is determined by the cost 
of the protective measure per unit time, a, and the monetary value of the unit 
collective dose, a [3]. The optimum protection would be obtained if the protective 
measure is introduced when the effective individual dose per unit time exceeds a 
given value, Eop(, and is terminated when the effective dose per unit time drops 
below this value. The derived intervention level, Éopt, will be: 
B„P, = I (4) 
Based on the newly modified risk factor recommended by the ICRP [2J. an upper 
level of o can be set at 20,000 t /manSv [3], equivalent to approximately 140,000 
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SEK/manSv. assuming that the monetary value of one year of lost lifir dur lo 
radiation induced cancer should not exceed, in average for thr society, the Gross 
National Product (GNP) per capita ( - 27.000 S/year in 1990). However, thr 
Nordic Radiation Protection Authorities have a.:.orated that "up lo 100.000 S 
would be a reasonable value to spend for reducing the collective dose by I manSv". 
Tbe optimization calculations include - for illustrative purposes only - this "high" 
rt-value and also a "low" a-value of 1.000 S/manSv. 
3.1.1. Sheltering in the Primary Phase 
The averted collective dose in the primary phase by sheltering the total population 
during the plume passage is 9.5 manSv and thr total cost is 3.4 Million SEK Thr 
net benefit. B. can therefore be calculated from (I) and (2) to be: 
0 , = 7.000 SEK/manSv 95 manSv - 3 4 MSEK 
= -3.33 MSEK 
Eh = 140,000 SEK/manSv 9.5 manSv-3 .4 MSEK 
= - 2 . 0 7 MSEK 
£ 3 = 700.000 SEK/manSv 9.5 manSv - 3.4 MSEK 
= 3.25 MSEK 
When the net benefit is negative, sheltering is not justified based on radiological 
protection factors of risk reduction and monetary costs alone. Sheltering is justified 
only if thr monetary value assigned to the unit collective dose is higher than 
300.000 SEK as in case 3 with the "high" a-value. 
The cost of sheltering for 15 hours has been determined to be 60 SEK/person 
if all people are sheltered. The IL for the introduction of sheltering for 15 hours 
can then be calculated to be: 
/ • \ 60SEK/15h _ „ _ „ r ,_ 
W . - 7.000 S E K / S v * 1 0 m S v / 1 5 h 
(i. \ 60SEK/15h 
700,000 SEK/Sv 3r 0.1 mSv/15 h 
The cost of sheltering those working at night has been has been determined to 
be 1,000 SEK/person. The IL for the introduction of sheltering can therefore be 
calculated to be: 
ft. \ 1,000SEK/15h
 i W 1 „ _ . , . . 
M , - 7.000 SEK/Sv »'»"8»/'»> 
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M, - 1.000 SEK/15 h .. , . 700.000 SEK/S\ 
Thr meaning of É^, b that only if thr individual »lusrs averted b>- shrhrting 
during thr 15 hours plumr passage wouhi exceed ti^,. thr mrasun* sbuuid br 
introdurrd. As thr avrrtrd individual dusr by shrlirring b 0.17 mSv/15 h (sr*-
Sect. 2.1). only in casr 3 for thr total population, for which É^, < 0.17 mSv. 
sheltering b justifird as abo drtmninrd from thr nrt benefit. Bj > 0. 
Sheltering of thosr working at night b not justifird for any of the considered 
a-valucs. Sheltering of thosr not working at night b. huwrvrr. justifird undrr all 
circumstances because thr rost b approximately zrru. 
3.1.2. Sheltering in the Secondary Phase 
Thr averted collective door in thr secondary phase by sheltering all pregnant for 
1-1 days b 0.2S manSv and thr total cost is 5 Milium SEK. Thr nrt benefit. B. 
will be: 
B, = 7.000 SEK/manSv 0.25 manSv - 5 MSEK 
= -4.99 MSEK 
Bz = 140,000 SEK/manSv 0.25 maaSv-5MSEK 
= -4.97 MSEK 
B3 = 700.000 SEK/manSv 0.25 manSv - 5 MSEK 
= -4*3 MSEK 
Sheltering of pregnant women a not justified based on radiological protection 
fartors of risk reduction and monetary costs alone but b justified only if thr 
monetary value assigned to the unit collective dose b higher than 20 Million SEK 
The average cost of sheltering all pregnant women for 14 days have been esti-
mated to be around 10.000 SEK/person. The 1L for thr introduction of sheltering 
for 14 days can be calculated to be: 
/ i . \ 10.000SEK/14d^,, ^
 e / . . J 
M . * 7.000 SEK/Sv **-SO0"W»H 
\E~h ~ 140,000SEK/Sv ~ 7 0 m S v / 1 4 d 
ft. \ 10.000 SEK/14 d . , . _ . „ . 
( M , = 700.000 SEK/Sv - 1 0 m S v / " d 
The averted individual dose by sheltering pregnant women and children is 0.25 
mSv/14 d (see Sect. 2.2.1). which u far below Éoft even for the highest o-valur. 
Therefore, sheltering of pregnant women in the secondary phase is not justified 
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far anv of the considered o-valnes. 
* * * mm™""****"* MenJU »>4nW»l VlnMWW^nui 
The averted collective dosr by sheltering *U mothers and their two children for N 
days B 3.75 manSv and the total cost is 25 Million SEK. The net benefit. B. will 
be: 
B, = 7.000 SEK/manSr 3.75 manSv - 25 MSEK 
• -24.97 MSEK 
B, * 140,000 SEK/manSv 3.75 ma»Sv-25MSEK 
* - 2 4 . 4 8 MSEK 
S) s 700.000 SEK/manSv 3.75 manSv - 25 MSEK 
= -22.38 MSEK 
Sheltering of mothers is not justified based on radiolopca! protection factors of 
risk redaction and monetary costs alone, but b justified only if the monetary value 
assigned to the unit coDectrvr dose is higher than 7 Million SEK. 
The average cost of sheltering all mothers and their two children lor 14 days 
have been estimated to be around 5.000 SEK/mother + 2 children. The IL for thr 
introduction of sheltering for 14 days can be calculated to be: 
ft \ 5.000 SEK/14 d . „ _ . „ . I L i I = 3s 7 mSv/14 d \ "**/J 700.000 SEK/Sv , n a ' l * a 
The averted individual doses (per mother + 2 children) are far below É^, even 
for the highest o-value. Therefore, sheltering of mothers and their children is not 
justified for any of the considered o-values. 
Mothers working nt night M»d thnir children 
The average cost of sheltering mothers working at night and their two children 
has been estimated to be around 10.000 SEK/mother + 2 children. The IL for the 
introduction of sheltering for 14 days can be calculated to be: 
f t x ]O^00SEK/14d 
( M - 7,000 SEK/SV » i . « » » » / m 
(r \ - 10,000 SEK/14 d ^ _ • _ , , -
 A \B"h = 140,000 SEK/Sv - ™mSv/14d 
it, \ 10.000 SEK/14 d ^ 1 / v - . . . . (Eft - T ^ ~ W ,
 e«,tr/e ^10mSv/14d V ^Vj 700,000 SEK/Sv 
Ris*-R-641(EN) 27 
The averted individual doses (per mother + 2 children) are far below Eopt even 
for the highest a-value. Sheltering of mothers working at night is therefore not 
justified for any of the considered a-values. 
It should be emphasized that long-term sheltering, that is for more than about 
12 hours, may cause social, medical and hygiene problems, except in specially 
designed facilities. For a period of 24 hours or longer, food and medical care for 
shelter occupants will also need to be considered [5j. 
3.1.3. Evacuation in the Secondary Phase 
Pregnant women 
The averted collective dose in the secondary phase by evacuating pregnant women 
is 1.13 manSv and the total cost is 5.8 Million SEK. The ne* benefit, B, will be: 
Bi = 7,000 SEK/manSv-1.13 manSv - 5.8 MSEK 
= -5.79 MSEK 
B2 = 140,000 SEK/manSv • 1.13 manfv-5 .8 MSEK 
= -5 .64 MSEK 
fl3 = 700,000 SEK/manSv-1.13 manSv-5.8 MSEK 
= -5.01 MSEK 
Evacuation of pregnant women is not justified based on radiological protection 
factors of risk reduction and monetary costs alone. Evacuation is justified only if 
the monetary value assigned to the unit collective dose is higher than 5 Million 
SEK. 
The average cost of evacuating occupationally active pregnant women for 14 
days has been estimated to be around 11,600 SEK/person. The IL for the intro-
duction of evacuation for 14 days can be calculated to be: 
(b \ l? ,CQ0SEK/14d^ n n 
M a = 700,000 SEK/Sv- 2 0 m S v / 1 4 d 
The averted average individual dose by evacuating a pregnant woman and her un-
born child is 2 x 1.12 mSv/14 d (see Sect. 2.3), which is far below the calculated 
values of Éopt. Therefore, evacuation of pregnant women is not justified for any 
of the considered a-values. 
All mothers and their children 
The averted collective dose by evacuating all women and their children (15,000 
people) for 14 days is 16.8 manSv and the total cost is 49 Million SEK. The net 
benefit, B, will be: 
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B, = 7,000 SEK/manSv • 16.8 manSv - 49 MSEK 
= -48.88 MSEK 
B2 = 140,000 SEK/manSv 16.8 m a n S v - 4 9 MSEK 
- -46 .65 MSEK 
B3 = 700,000 SEK/manSv-16.8 manSv-49 MSEK 
= -37.24 MSEK 
Evacuation of mothers and their children is not justified based on radiological pro-
tection factors of risk reduction and monetary costs alone. Evacuation is justified 
only if the monetary value assigned to the unit collective dose is higher '„nan 3 
Million SEK. 
The average cost of evacuating a mother and her two children for 1-t days has 
been estimated to be around 9,800 SEK. The IL for the introduction of evacuation 
for 14 days can be calculated to be-
(h \ 9,800 SEK/14d „ M „ , , 
W , - 7,000 SEK/Sv ^ 5 0 0 m S v / 1 4 d 
(v \ - 9.800 SEK/14 d ^ , f t _ p _ . , . „ A 
\E<"\ 140,000SEK/Sv " 7 0 m S v / 1 4 d 
/t \ 9,800 SEK/14 d _ n _ M j J 
( M a * 700,000 SEK/Sv a i 0 m S v / 1 4 d 
The averted individual dose for a mother and her two children by evacuation for a 
period of 14 days is far below the calculated values of Éopt. Therefore, evacuation 
of mothers and their children is not justified for any of the considered a-values. 
Occupat;onally active mothers and their children 
The average cost of evacuating occupational^ active mothers and their children 
has been estimated to be around 14,800 SEK. The IL for the introduction of 
evacuation for 14 days can be calculated to be: 
(M, - ^ g ^ "*»-/>» 
(h \ 14,800 SEK/14 d ^ o n _ „„ . 
W , - 700,000 SEK/Sv ^ 2 0 m S v / 1 4 d 
The averted individual Hose for a mother and her two children by evacuation for a 
period of 14 days is far below the calculated values of Éopt. Therefore, evacuation 
of ocupationally active mothers and their children is not y stifled for any of the 
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considered a-values. 
Non-occupationally active mothers and their children 
The average cost of evacuating non-occupationally active mothers and their chil-
dren has been estimated to be around 4,800 SEK. The IL for the introduction of 
evacuation for 14 days car. be calculated to be: 
The averted individual dose by evacuation for a period of 14 days is far below 
the calculated value of Eopt. Therefore, evacuation of non-occupationally active 
mothers and their children is not justified for any of the considered a-values. 
3.1.4. Relocation in the Long-Term Phase 
The averted individual doses by relocation in the beginning of the long-term phase 
is around 0.5 mSv/month. The cost per person for relocation is 15.300 SEK/month 
taking into consideration accomodation costs (2.000 SEK/month) and lost job 
(13,300 SEK/month) (see Section 2.4). 
Relocation with loss of job 
The net benefit, B, of relocating one individual in the long-term phase if the job 
is lost will be: 
Bi = 7,000 SEK/manSv • 0.0005 Sv/month - 15.300 SEK/month 
= -15,297 SEK/month 
B2 = 140,000 SEK/manSv • 0.0005 Sv/month-15,300 SEK/month 
= -15,230 SEK/month 
B3 = 700,000 SEK/manSv • 0.0005 Sv/month - 15.300 SEK/month 
= -14,950 SEK/month 
Relocation is not justified based on radiological protection factors of risk reduc-
tion and monetary costs alone. Relocation is justified only if the monetary value 
assigned to the unit collective dose is higher than 30 Million SEK. 
The IL for the introduction (and withdrawal) of relocation for optimum pro-
tection expressed as averted effective individual dose per unit time, Éopt, can be 
calculated to be: 
/ * \ 15,3U0 SEK/month ^ „ „„„
 0 . 
( M = 7,000 SEK/Sv ^ 2,000 mSv/month 
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/ ^ \ 15,300 SEK/month „„
 0 , 
(M = 700,000 SEK/Sv ^OmSv/month 
The averted individual dose per unit time by relocating people in the long-term 
phase of around 0.5 mSv/month is below the calculated values of Eopt for all the 
considered a-values, and relocation is therefore not justified. 
Relocation without loss of job 
The net benefit, B, of relocating one individual in the long-term phase if the job 
not is lost will be: 
Bi = 7,000 SEK/manSv • 0.0005 Sv/month - 2,000 SEK/month 
= -1,997 SEK/month 
B2 = 140,000 SEK/manSv 0.0005 Sv /month-2 ,000 SEK/month 
= - 1 , 9 3 0 SEK/month 
B3 = 700.000 SEK/manSv • 0.0005 Sv/month - 2.000 SEK/month 
= -1,650 SEK/month 
Relocation is not justified based on radiological protection factors of risk reduc-
tion and monetary costs alone. Relocation is justified only if the monetary value 
assigned to the unit collective dose is higher than 4 Million SEK. 
The IL for the introduction (and withdrawal) of relocation for optimum pro-
tection expressed as averted effective individual dose per unit time, Éopt, can be 
calculated to be: 
/ * \ 2,000 SEK/month _ „„„ . . 
( M , " 7,000 SEK/Sv *300n,Sv/m,nth 
ft, \ 2,000 SEK/month _ „ „ . 
( M 3 = 700,000 SEK/Sv * 3 m S v / m ° " t h 
The averted individual dose per unit time by relocating people in the long-term 
phase is below the calculated values of Eopl for all the considered a-values, and 
relocation is therefore not justified. 
3.1.5. Decontamination in the Long-Term Phase 
Experiments with decontamination of urban surfaces and experience from the 
Chernobyl accident indicate that a realistic large scale reduction factor is not 
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higher than 2. If it is assumed that a large scale decontamination campaign can 
be carried out with a two-fold reduction of the external dose rate, the individual 
external dose averted in a lifetime of 70 years will be of the order of 60 mSv per 
person over this period. 
Decontamination can be a fairly costly process. Decontamination is justified 
if the cost is less than the monetary value of the collective dose averted. Cost 
estimates for decontamination have ranged between 1,000 $ and 10.000 $ per 
person depending on the population density in the area to be contaminated [4]. 
The averted lifetime dose of 60 mSv is equivalent to a monetary value of 60 $. 
1.200 $ and 6.000 $ for the three a-values. respectively, implying that a large 
scale decontamination would be justified only if the decontamination efficiency is 
a factor of 2 or more, and then only for very high and unrealistic monetary values 
assigned to the unit collective dose. 
3.1.6. Milk Restrictions 
The potential collective effective dose per unit mass of milk is proportional to the 
concentration of the radionuclide in the milk. C. and the committed effective dose 
per unit activity intake, e [3]: 
S = C e (5) 
The optimized Intervention Level (IL) expressed as activity concentration in the 
milk/milk product can be calculated from the cost per unit mass of milk, 6. and 
the collective effective dose per unit mass of milk, 5: 
0 - 5 - 6 = 0 (6) 
a-Ce-b=0=> (7) 
Copt = — (8) 
Q • e 
The meaning of Copi is that restrictions should be introduced when the activity 
concentration in milk. C, is greater than Cop, and be terminated when C < Copt. 
The cost of milk/milk products is assumed to be 7 SEK/kg [3]. and the averted 
collective effective dose in the year following the accident, if the milk is removed 
from human consumption, is assumed to be 0.02 manmSv/kg (see Sect. 2.5). The 
net benefit, B. can therefore be calculated to be: 
Bj = 7,000 SEK/manSv • 0.00002 manSv/kg - 7 SEK/kg 
= -6.86 SEK/kg 
B2 = 140,000 SEK/manSv 0.00002 manSv/kg - 7 SEK/kg 
= -4 .20 SEK/kg 
B3 = 700,000 SEK/manSv • 0.00002 manSv/kg - 7 SEK/kg 
= 7 SEK/kg 
Milk restriction is justified only in case 3 with the "high" o-value where the net 
benefit is positive. 
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The IL for the introduction (and withdrawal) of measures for optimum protec-
tion in form of removing the milk from human food can be calculated to be: 
M = 7,000 S E K / ^ 2 g 5 n S v / B q = 8 Q O 0 0 B ^ ^ 
( < M 2 = 140,000 SEK/Sv 1?2.5 nSv/Bq = 4 ' 0 0 0 B q / k g 
7 SEK/kg (<M3 = 700,000 SEK/Sv 12.5 nSv/Bq = 800 Bq/kg 
The potential averted collective dose for the first year is assumed to be 0.02 man-
mSv/kg (see Sect. 2.5). This value corresponds to an activity concentration of 
1,600 Bq/kg. Therefore, milk restriction is justified only in case 3 as also deter-
mined from the net benefit, Bi > 0. 
3.2 International Guidance 
No clear consensus has yet emerged internationally on the most appropriate quan-
tity to use for expressing intervention levels of dose. What is absolutely clear 
however is that, when making judgements on relocation or any other protective 
measure, it is the dose averted that has to be balanced against the costs and 
any other dis-benefits of taking the measure. Consequently, criteria expressed in 
any other terms can only be surrogates for the dose averted. 
Th< re are considerable, if not insupearble, difficulties associated with the for-
mulation of fairly precise, yet generally applicable, quantitative guidance on relo-
cation in terms of averted dose or indeed any other quantity. The quantity, dose 
rate (which is not the same as dose in a year), offers the greatest potential in this 
context. Judgements on the optimum level of averted dose at which relocation 
should be implemented would, in general, depend on the period over which the 
dose was averted and for which the relocation was foreseen. For example, different 
judgements could be expected where relocation of say several months and tens of 
years, respectively, were required to avert the same level of dose. 
If the quantity, dose in a year, is used as a surrogate for the dose averted, this 
is consistent with the principles of intervention. Despite its extensive use for the 
purposes of formulating criteria for relocation (the current IAEA guidance [1] is 
expressed in these terms), there are negative aspects of its use. Conceptually, there 
are no compelling reasons for choosing one year as the time period of reference 
in preference to any other period; indeed there may be strong arguments to the 
contrary. 
Familiarity and the use of this period for the purposes of expressing many other 
quantities may have been instrumental in its choice. The latter, however, is respon-
sible for the main problem with this quantity, that is the possibility of it being 
misinterpreted. This arises because direct comparison, however inappropriately, 
can be readily made with annual dose limits and erroneous conclusions drawn. 
One area where there bas been much confusion over the role of dose limits 
in determining intervention has been the imposition of foodstuff restrictions in 
the longer term following an accident and at distances far from the release. It has 
been argued that, because exposures from contaminated foodstuffs are controllable 
(i.e. by restricting their production or consumption), they should be subjected to 
the full system of dose limitation, including the application of the dose limits 
recommended by the ICRP. This, however, represents a misinterpretation of the 
intent of ICRP's recommendations. 
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Despite the problems with the present international guidance on intervention 
levehi. the current indicative guidance from the IAEA is presented below for the 
protective measures under consideration: sheltering, evacuation, food restrictions 
and relocation. For each protective measure a range of intervention levels is given, 
in principle emerging from an optimization process and reflecting the character-
istics of the accident, the local environmental conditions and the severity of the 
protective measure itself: 
Sheltering: A few to a few tens of mSv in the first 24 hours 
Evacuation: Ten to a few hundred mSv in the first 24 hours 
Food control: One to a few tens of mSv committed from annual 
intakes for each of seven main categories of foodstuffs 
Relocation: A few to a hundred of mSv over a year 
The international guidance on realism in the application of intervention is clear. 
In general, the criteria should be applied to an average member of the group 
affected by the protective measure and the estimate of the dose averted should be 
as realistic as possible. The adoption of cautious approaches of dose assessment 
will inevitable result in action being taken that is sub-optimal and contrary to the 
principles and purposes of intervention. 
4 Conclusions 
The results of the justification/optimization calculations for different protective 
measures are summarised in the Table below. For each protective measure, three 
different results are given, corresponding to three different monetary values of the 
unit collective dose used (1.000 $/manSv. 20,000 $/manSv and 100,000 $/manSv). 
Also shown in the Table are the individual doses averted by the protective mea-
sures. 
The individual doses averted by evacuation in the secondary phase are below 
the lower value of intervention level range for evacuation given in the indicative 
guidance from the IAEA. 
The individual doses averted by relocation in the long-term phase of about 6 
mSv/year are above but close to the lower value of the range of intervention level 
given in the indicative guidance from the IAEA. According to the IAEA, the in-
dicative nature of the guidance is such that it must not be taken to preclude values 
outside the specified range. In addition, it would be erroneous to select arbitrar-
ily values from the bottom of the range of levels. Consequently, for relocation of 
large urban areas like Visby, the optimum value of intervention will probably fall 
outside the range at the top level as also indicated by the optimization calcula-
tions in Section 31.4. The reason is the disruptive character [5] and major costs 
of relocation. 
The collective dose averted by milk restrictions will be about 0.02 manmSv/kg 
milk the first year after the accident. With an individual consumption rate of 175 
kg milk per year, the average individual dose would be about 4 mSv/y. This dose 
level is also close to the lower value of the intervention level range given in the 
indicative guidance from the IAEA for a single main food category. 
The individual doses from the postulated accident that would have contami-
nated the island of Gotland are, for the primary and secondary phases, of a mag-
nitude that would not call for intervention in form of sheltering and evacuation. 
The rate of dose accumulation (0.5 mSv/month) from deposited cesium with a 
contamination density of 137Cs of the order of 1 - 2 MBq/m2 is of the same order 
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of magnitude as in the highest contaminated areas in the USSR caused by the 
Chernobyl accident. The conclusion of the International Chernobyl Project 
with respect to the most contaminated areas was that relocation is not necessary 
because the aveiage doses that could be potentially averted would be of the same 
order as or less than the doses due to average natural background radiation. 
Consequently, even if the estimated external doses in the city of Visby from 
deposited u ' Cs is of the order of 2 mSv/year in average over 70 years, ie. equal 
to the annual average doses in the most contaminated areas in the USSR, the 
conclusion is that no relocation should be introduced in the city of Visby or 
elsewhere at the island in the long-term phase because the extra incremental in-
dividual risk is of the order of about 1 in 10.000 per annum. This additional 
risk, while not trivial, is marginal in comparison with risks experienced in ev-
eryday life and in itself would not justify such a radical measure as relocation. 
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Intervention Levels for Exercise Sievert Gotland 
Sheltering 
primary phase 
Total 
population 
Those working 
at night 
Sheltering 
secondary phase 
Pregnant 
women 
All mothers 
and their 
children 
Mothers working 
at night and 
their children 
Evacuation 
secondary phase 
Pregnant 
women 
All mothers 
and their 
children 
Occupational!) 
active mothers 
and their children 
Non-occupationally 
active mothers 
and their children 
Relocation 
late phase 
With loss 
of job 
Without loss 
of job 
Milk restrictions 
late phase 
Total 
population 
Averted dose 
0.17 mSv/15 h 
0.17m3v/15h 
Averted dose 
0.25 mSv/14 d 
3 x 0.25 mSv/14 d 
3 x 0.25 mSv/14 d 
Averted dose 
1.12 mSv/14 d 
3 x 1.12 mSv/14 d 
3 x 1.12 mSv/14 d 
3 x 1.12mSv/14d 
Averted dose 
0.5 mSv/month 
0.5 mSv/month 
Averted dose 
0.02 manmSv/kg 
IL 
10 mSv/15 h 
0.4 mSv/15 h 
0.1 mSv/15 h 
150 mSv/15 h 
7 mSv/15 h 
1 mSv/15 h 
IL 
1.500 mSv/14 d 
70 mSv/14 d 
10 mSv/14 d 
700 mSv/14 d 
40 mSv/14 d 
7 mSv/14 d 
1.500 mSv/14d 
70 mSv/14 d 
10 mSv/14 d 
IL 
1.500 mSv/14d 
80 mSv/14 d 
20 mSv/14 d 
1,500 mSv/14 d 
70 mSv/14 d 
10 mSv/14 d 
2,000 mSv/14 d 
100 mSv/14 d 
20 mSv/14 d 
700 mSv/14 d 
30 mSv/14 d 
7 mSv/14 d 
IL 
2,000 mSv/month 
100 mSv/month 
20 mSv/month 
300 mSv/month 
10 mSv/month 
3 mSv/month 
IL 
80 kBq/kg 
4 kBq/kg 
0.8 kBq/kg 
Justification 
not justified 
not justified 
just ified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
Justification 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
Justification 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
Justification 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
not justified 
Justification 
not justified 
not justified 
justified 
The individual doses averted by sheltering, both during the primary and the sec-
ondary phases, are below the lower value of the intervention level range for shel-
tering given in the indicative guidance from the IAEA. 
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Annex II. Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis 
by 
Kari Sinkko 
1 Introduction 
This annex provides applications on how multi-
attribute utility analysis can be used when plan-
ning protective actions. Generally, the aim of a 
decision-aiding technique, including utility 
analysis is to help to analyze the decision prob-
lem by providing a mathematical method for 
comparing and ranking the actions, and most im-
portantly, by bringing more insight and under-
standing into decisions; to render explicit what 
factors and numbers are important and what are 
the consequences of an action. Those interested 
in the theory of decision and utility analysis may 
consult the literature (Fr88, Wi86, Ke76). 
In order to translate the verbal descriptions of 
a decision problem into a mathematical model 
the problem has to be broken down into small 
pieces that can be dealt with individually and 
then recombined logically. In formulating the 
problem a clear distinction is made between the 
choices that can be made (the actions), the charac-
teristics of the actions ( the attributes) and the 
relative desirability of the different sets of char-
acteristics (preferences). The important part of the 
analysis, the structuring of a problem, is de-
scribed carefully in the examples presented be-
low. 
It is worth noting that the protective actions to 
be analyzed and ranked in this document are 
base cases which probably can be replaced by 
more carefully planned - fine tuned - actions. For 
example for a single protective problem there 
might be a combination of actions or certain sub-
groups of population for whom a specified action 
will be justified. The scope of this study is not to 
find the best actions, but to present a method for 
ranking the actions and evaluating intervention 
levels. If new, feasible actions are identified the 
analysis should be revised. It should be noted 
that if new actions are defined the ranking of 
original actions is not changed. 
In utility analysis the evaluation of alternatives 
is commonly performed by means of additive util-
ity functions. The existence of additive utility 
functions is normally verified during the analysis 
- and should, in principle, be verified. In this 
example we assume that the analysis can be per-
formed by additive utility functions and that 
their existence is verified (Ke86, Si91). 
2.1 Sheltering in the Primary 
Phase 
The first step in the analysis is the identification 
of the protective actions which could be taken. In 
the primary phase the actions considered are shel-
tering of all inhabitants and no-action, accepting the 
status quo. 
Attributes in decision analysis are the variables 
that are used for comparing the actions. All ac-
tions are represented as levels of k attributes: 
a = (a„a2,...ak), 
where a* is the level of action a on i:th attribute. 
In the primary phase in this example the attri-
butes considered important when a making deci-
sion on sheltering are the health detriment caused 
by dose and the monetary costs of sheltering. The 
health detriments caused by radiation are mea-
sured as a collective dose. The values of dose 
attribute in the various actions are between 4.14 
and 414 manSv due to the uncertainty associated 
with the prediction of dose (Table BI, cf. Section 
4.1). The scale of dose to be used in the calcula-
tion is 0 - 500 manSv. Correspondingly, the scale 
of costs attribute is 0 - 3.4 million SEK. The 
utility analysis of sheltering is based on the deci-
sion Table BI. 
As mentioned in Section 3.1 the uncertainty of 
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TåbUIU. Decision wbUcf the earfyptetettivt actions. In parentheses doses art ghenimmamSvamd ike costs of 
actions m mllwn SEK (memSv, MSEK). 
Fall-out level 
Low Projected High 
No action (4.14.0) (414.0) (414.0) 
Sheltering (319.3.4) (319.3.4) (319.3.4) 
Probabilities 
0.3 0 6 0.1 
the dose estimate is described by assessing the 
probability of 0.6 on the best estimate of dose and 
the probabilities of 0.3 and 0.1 on the values that 
are, by a factor of 10, lower or higher, respective-
ly, given as the fall-out levels in the table BI. 
The uncertainty associated with the predicted 
dose has to be assessed in the real situation and it 
will influence the intervention level. 
The values of attributes in various actions, as 
well as the preferences of a decision maker con-
nected to the levels of attributes, are convened by 
a utility function to common units called utility, 
normally between zero and one (see Section S.S). 
The most preferred level of an attribute is as-
signed a utility of one, the least preferred level is 
assigned a value of zero. The intermediate values 
are assessed by the utility function. The simplest 
conversion is a straight line, where a unit change 
in the value of an attribute corresponds to an 
equal change in utility. 
By definition, the utility function u(.) repre-
sents a decision maker's preferences between the 
values a and b: 
u(a) ;> u(b), 
if, and only if, be holds a at least as good as b. 
Note, in group decisions - in social choices - at 
least in a democracy, the decision makers) repre-
sents the population, on behalf of whom the deci-
sion is made, its preferences which are expected 
to be considered in a fair and just solution. 
The single-attribute utility functions for the 
dose and costs attributes have been assessed by a 
method called the reference experiment (Ke77, 
Fr88, Sm89, Si91). In the reference experiment 
e.g. the following two hypothetical options are 
given to the decision maker: 
Option A: the dose is 0 manSv with a probabil-
ity of 0.4 or, otherwise, the dose is 
500 manSv with a probability of 0.6. 
Option B: The dose is 250 manSv for certain. 
If the decision maker is indifferent between op-
tions A and B, and we have chosen u(0 manSv) 
= 1.0 and u(500 manSv) = 0, then, according to 
the theory, u(250 manSv) = 0.4. 
In other words the change in dose from 500 
manSv to 200 manSv is equally preferred to the 
change from 200 manSv to zero manSv i.e. he/ 
she always prefers entering a lottery to receiving 
a dose equal to its expected value. This implies a 
risk seeking attitude. Generally, the attitude to-
ward risk results in a threat of defeat connected 
to the decision. In this case there is a threat of 
loss of money or an increased risk of health detri-
ment (Ka82, Si91). 
By fitting a commonly used exponential func-
tion to the defined points, the assessed single-at-
tribute utility functions are u,(s) for the dose at-
tribute and uc(c) for the costs attribute, respect-
ively: 
u.vs)= 1.78e-°«n*-0.78 
u^c)= Uår«**-0.78 
The assessed utility function for dose is shown in 
Figure Bl. 
In the introduction we have assumed that the 
utility of a protective action can be represented 
by the additive utility function: 
utø-IiMfa), (Bl) 
where u^a,) are single-attribute utility functions 
assessed above. The constants kj are introduced 
to bring the total utility of an action (a) onto a 
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Figure Bl. The assessed udhty function for åose. 
common scale, between acre and one. A more 
important role of these constants is that they re-
present die judgement of tbe decision maker on 
die relative importance of the levels of dose and 
cost attributes. Swing weighting is an assessment 
method for scaling constants. The decision ma-
ker is asked to compare a pair of hypothetical 
actions which differ only in their values along 
two attribute scales. In tbe assessment the real 
values of tbe attributes are used instead of utili-
ties connected to these values. If there are more 
than two attributes other attributes are fixed to 
their nominal level during the assessment. In tbe 
method a set of hypothetical options is given to 
tbe decision maker until an indifferent pair of 
options is found. For example: 
Option A: Tbe collective dose is 250 manSv and 
the monetary costs are 0.6 MSEK. 
Option B: The collective dose is 230 manSv and 
the monetary costs are 3.4 MSEK. 
If the options A and B are indifferent to tbe 
decision maker it can be seen that the decision 
maker is willing to invest 2.8 MSEK to reduce 
tbe collective dose by 20 manSv, i.e. the trade-off 
value - the value of a - is 140 000 SEK/manSv. 
When assessing the trade-off value it is impor-
tant to secure that apart from pure costs and dose 
other factors are not mixed or considered in the 
assessment. If other factors are felt important 
they should be added to tbe attribute list. Also 
generally, decision analysis does not require an 
accurate trade-off value but a range; the mini-
mum and the maximum investment in order to 
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5 0 0 nanSv 
reduce radiation risks. A rough mean value could 
be used in the analysis and tbe effect of its uncer-
tainty is studied afterwards in a comprehensive 
sensitivity analysis. The demand for a relative nar-
row range of a trade-off value is based on tbe fan 
that tbe decision maker must be striving for a 
just and fair decision. 
To gain insight in the assessment of the trade-
off value several methods presented in literature 
can be used of which I would like to mention tbe 
'human capitaT- and 'willingness » pay' principles. 
Also a consideration of die amount of money 
currently invested by society in reducing non-
radiological risks, eg. avoiding a final cancer, 
render tbe judgement, should it be in harmony 
with the investments in radiation protection. 
It is expected that tbe state will not reimburse 
the COSB of sheltering, but the costs are paid for 
by tbe households. To reach a fair and just deci-
sion tbe population's own trade-off value also has 
to be determined. A fair and just decision could 
also be attributed to tbe population's acceptance 
of a protective action. 
The 'willingness to pay' principle is apparently 
a useful indicator of die trade-off value when an 
individual is protecting his own health or life. 
When a man's health is at risk and be himself 
pays for his own safety, be should also be allowed 
to make his own decision. 
Although the population might accept tbe 
average cost of sheltering, 60 SEK/person even in 
low doses, the trade-off value should not be based 
on the population's acceptance of low costs. This 
might lead to inconsistencies with other protec-
tive actions and to irrational behaviour. 
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In this study it was decided to use the trade-off 
value of MO 000 SEK/manSv as a central value -
as a rough mean value - and that the sensiiivity 
analysis should be performed to the relatively 
vride range of the a-vdue of 7 000 - 700 000 
SEK/nunSv. 
By using the trade-off value of MO 000 SER 
aaanSv the decision maker is willing to invest 3.4 
•attboa SEK in order to decrease the dose by 
24.3 manSv, ef. from 500 mar.Sv to 47S.7 
manSv. Thus, fer him, the following hypotheti-
cal actions are indifferent 
(0 MSEK, 500 manSv) and 
(3.4 MSEK, 475.7 mauSv). (B2) 
Substituting B2 to formula Bl (generally, no 
matter if the utility function is additive or multi-
plicative) and using the definitions u,(0) * u^O) 
- I and 11^500) » 11^3.4) « 0, we get k,u^475.7) 
» kfU^ OX From tbe assessed single-attribute 
utility function for dose we get u/475.7) * 0.05 
and thus k, • 0.05k,. We have assumed that the 
analysis can be performed by additive uttlity 
tunctions, then kj + k, » I, and It, * 0.05 and 
k, - 0.95. 
The utility function that has been normalised 
between zero and one is: 
u(s*)» 0.9S(1.7«e-*»*»-0.7S) 
+ 0.05(1.7le-«*-0.7SX 
Because there are uncertainties linked to a de-
cision i.e. tbe attribute levels are defined in terms 
of probabilities the sum to be calculated is called 
tbeafecuduhluy: 
XtiptøkjHtøi), 
where the probability p(a,) is tbe occurrence of a 
certain attribute i level i, and EjKa,) s 1, by 
definition. Tbe probability information is used 
to define a certain or non- probability level that 
should be equally preferred to the probability 
distribution. Tbe calculated certainty equivalent 
values are 58.0 manSv for no action and 46.1 
manSv for sheltering. The expected utility is de-
fined so that the decision maker's most preferred 
alternative has tbe maximum expected utility. 
The expected utility E = X, p, uCs,^) can now 
be calculated for different countcrmeasures, 
'Hen risk means a decision maker's attitude to risk as 
of a utility function. 
where p, are the probabilities of fall-out levdv 
Based on the figures presented above, the calcula-
ted utilities are: 
no action: 0.15 
sheltering: 0.S3. 
It is wise to take ihe ranking of the countermca-
sures with these figures with a pinch of salt if the 
variations of iudgaaentai input are not analyzed 
with a sensitivity analysis. We have to estimate 
what influence the chosen trade-off value be-
tween dose and cost, the variation in utilities i.e. 
the shape of utility functions, and the variation 
in the probabilities of fallout levels all have on 
the ranking of actions. Tbe sensitivity analysis 
currently used and implemented here examines 
the effects of varying one parameter at a time. 
The calculations were pciformed by a computer 
program (Smi9) and tbe results are briefly de-
scribed below. 
When assessing die influence of tbe trade-off 
value between dose and costs to the decision, an 
interesting piece of information is to find the 
krwak-evtn value i.e. the value of a, when the 
ranking of actions is changed. Tbe calculated 
break-even «CHAR E0» -value is nearly 300 000 
SEK/manSv which is in the range of 7 000 - 700 
000 SEK/manSv determined in this study. Thus 
the ranking depends on the value of a and - in 
principle - because of determined wide range of a 
the sheltering is justified. 
By choosing linear utility functions instead of 
risk' prone ones does not affect the ranking of 
actions. By linear, risk neutral utility functions 
no-action is slightly more picfcired to sheltering 
when comparing tbe actions with risk prone 
functions. On the contrary, if the decision maker 
is more risk seeking than assumed above, the 
utility ol sheltering will be slightly more close to 
the utility of no-action but the ranking of actions 
is not changed. Tbe effect of tbe probabilities of 
fallout levels has a stronger influence on the 
ranking of actions. If the probabilities are 
changed from 0.3,0.6,0.1 (low fallout, projected 
fallout, and high fallout, respectively) to 0.1,0.6, 
0.3 we arc near the break- even point. Thus the 
predicted dose and the probabilities of fallout le-
vels are important factors in considering tbe ac-
tions to be taken, but to a much lesser extent 
than tbe trade-off value. 
defined by the utility theory and modelled by the shape 
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Using the central trade-off value 140 000 SEW 
manSv and by assuming that the projected aver-
age individual dose to people staying outdoors 
during 15 hours' plume passage was predicted to 
be 3.7 mSv instead of 1.85 as assumed in the 
example (Section 3.1) we would be near the 
break-even point. The decision maker would 
then choose sheltering. Then the area-and-acci-
dent specific intervention level for sheltering the 
whole population would be 3.7 mSv accumulated 
during 15 hours corresponding to the outside 
dose. The range of intervention level correspond-
ing to the range of trade-off value of 7 000 - 700 
000 SEK/manSv is then 0.2 - 20 mSv. 
2.2 Sheltering and Evacuation in 
the Secondary Phase 
In the secondary phase the following actions are 
considered to mitigate the accident conse-
quences: no-action, sheltering of pregnant wo-
men and children up to the age of 14 years in 
their homes for 14 days, or the same group of 
pregnant women and children are evacuated for a 
period of 14 days to areas where the dose rate is 
10% of the dose rate at Gotland. 
The at'ributes which are considered to affect 
the decision are: the monetary costs of the counter-
measures, the individual dose, and the stress caused 
by evacuation or lung period sheltering. The 
costs of the various actions are shown in Table 
Bill (c.f. section 4.2 - 4.3). Based on figures pre-
sented in the tables BII and Bill the scale to be 
used in the calculation is: 0 -10 000 SEK, and for 
Table BII. The cumulative dose distributions in var-
ious measures as well as the outdoor gamma dose 
distribution. The individual dose to a given percent-
age of the population is less than or equal to the 
corresponding dose (mSv). 
Percentage of population Certainty 
Actions 10% 95% 100% equivalent 
(mSv) 
Outdoor dose 2 6 10 3.9 
No action 0.6 1.9 31 1.2 
Sheltering 0.5 1.5 2.5 0.97 
Evacuation 0.06 0.19 0 31 0.12 
dose: 0 - 1 0 mSv, respectively. The estimated 
individual outdoor gamma dose distribution and 
also the individual gamma dose distribution for 
various actions are shown in Table BII. 
In utility analysis it is possible to use the distri-
bution of an attribute instead of its mean value. 
This is demonstrated in this example by repla-
cing the collective dose by the individual dose 
distribution. The certainty equivalent given in 
Table BII is the same as the population weighted 
mean dose. The use of a mean value or distribu-
tion depends on the easiness in assessing the 
mean value or distribution. This is true with risk 
neutral utility functions. With risk prone utility 
functions the certainty equivalent values are low-
er indicating that e.g. the lower dose values are 
more preferred than the high ones. 
Warning time for the accident in question is 
short. There is not enough time for organizing 
transportation, accommodation for evacuees or 
the arrangements of evacuation localities and 
motivation of their inhabitants. Neither is there 
time enough for proper timing of the evacuation 
nor appropriate information. The limited time 
period to implement evacuation neglects human 
considerations and causes stress. The most im-
portant factors affecting the forming of stress are: 
Information, proper timing, voluntariness of eva-
cuation, and adaptation to new surroundings 
(Er92, Va82). Long-term sheltering - staying in-
doors for 14 days • will also cause .uod, social and 
medical problems for all the sheltered people 
which in this example are associated to the stress 
factor. 
In this example it is assumed that one third of 
the evacuees and one tenth of the people in the 
evacuation localities are experiencing stress for 
14 days. The estimated number of stressed people 
is 6000, corresponding to 230 »man years of 
stress«. When sheltering is considered all shel-
tered and some of their relatives are experiencing 
stress. The estimated number is 17 000 people 
corresponding to 650 man years of stress. The 
stress is here assumed to be caused by sheltering 
or evacuation, and thus if no-action is chosen no 
stress is experienced. The scale of the stress attri-
bute used is 0 - 650 man years. 
By giving the mean values for individual dose 
and costs the values of attributes in various ac-
tions are as is given in Table BUI. 
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Table Bill. The values of attributes in various ac-
tions. 
No action 
Sheltering 
Evacuation 
Dose 
(mSv) 
1.2 
0.97 
0.12 
Costs 
(SEK) 
0 
5000 
9800 
Stress 
(man y) 
0 
650 
230 
As a base case the values of attributes are con-
verted to the common scale by linear utility func-
tions. The method is the same in all its essentials 
as is presented in the example of sheltering in the 
primary phase. The decision maker's attitude apt 
to take risk is discussed in connection with the 
discussion of sensitivity analysis below. 
A private person is not willing to pay the costs 
of sheltering or evacuation, but it is expected that 
the state will reimburse them. If the reimburse-
ment of the costs and the compensation demands 
of increased risk caused by radiation are not 
mixed to the trade-off value between dose and 
costs, we can use the same range and central 
trade-off value as in the sheltering example. The 
central trrde-off value between dose and costs is 
set to 140 SEK/mSv in the calculation. 
The ratio of scaling constants k of dose and 
costs attributes can be assessed in a similar way 
as is presented in the example of sheltering by 
setting the stress attribute at some fixed level. 
The assessment of the relative imponance of the 
stress attribute can be done by selecting either 
the dose or the costs attribute whose levels will 
be varied in the trade-off. It is felt that a more 
natural way is to choose the dose attribute and 
trade the stress attribute against it. 
Apart from the physical detriment a fatal can-
cer will also cause stress to the patient and to 
his/her relatives, as an approximation of 10 man 
years of stress. In this example the expected num-
ber of fatal cancer cases in the group to be protec-
ted is one (1.2 mSv x 15 500 x 0.05 = 0.93). 
Excluding the costs from the trade-off, i.e. set-
ting the costs attribute on its nominal - fixed -
level, two simplified hypothetical alternatives A 
and B with a particular level on each of the dose 
and stress attributes are given to the decision ma-
ker: 
Option A: Individual dose is 1.25 mSv and the 
number of stressed man years is zero. 
Option B: Individual dose is zero and the num-
ber of stressed man years is 100. 
In this example, for the sake of simplicity, al-
ternatives A and B are assumed to be equally 
preferred by the decision maker. If other effects 
of dose, except stress, are excluded the stress ex-
perienced with a fatal cancer is felt much worse 
by the decision maker than stress experienced 
with sheltering or evacuation. It should be noted 
that the figures represented above are not based 
on any scientific study. 
By using the result of the hypothetical alterna-
tives the ratio of scaling constants between the 
costs, stress and dose attributes can now be calcu-
lated. If the sum of scaling the constants is nor-
malised to one the values of k,:s could be calcula-
ted. The calculated scaling constants are kC0MS = 
0.80,kdose = 0.11, and kstress = 0.09. 
Based on the figures presented above and using 
a computer program (Sm89) to make the calcula-
tions slightly easier, the calculated expected utili-
ties for various actions are: 
no action: 0.99 
sheltering: 0.50 
evacuation: 0.18 
In a sensitivity analysis the effect of the decision 
maker's risk seeking attitude is verified by using 
risk prone utility functions for all attributes. The 
shape of the utility function, for example for 
costs, is defined so that by substituting 5000 SEK 
in the function, the utility is 0.4, instead of 0.5 as 
it is for a risk neutral decision maker. With risk 
prone functions the calculated utilities are: 
no action: 0.98 
sheltering: 0.42 
evacuation: 0.22 
The concaveness of the utility function, i.e. the 
decision maker(s) risk seeking attitude, has a 
minor effect on the results. This is due to the 
smoothness of the u'ility function and (c.f. Fig-
ure IB), most importantly, to the relative large 
uncertainties associated with the trade-off values. 
No-action is producing much more good than 
harm compared to sheltering or evacuation. Ei-
ther changing the trade-off vaiue to a value fifty 
times greater or increasing man years of stress 
from 100 to 1000 (see trade-off option B) do not 
change the ranking of the actions. If both these 
changes are made at the same time the utility of 
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evacuation is near to no-action. In this case the 
break-even point is reached if either of these va-
lues is increased. Sheltering is never an optimal 
measure. 
The analysis indicates that the projected dose 
should be high, before the short term evacuation 
becomes an optimal action. The intervention le-
vel for evacuation, using the central trade-off va-
lue of 140 SEK/mSv, is 80 mSv. The range of the 
intervention level is 4 - 400 mSv, corresponding 
to the range of the trade-off value between dose 
and cost. 
2.3 Milk Restrictions 
Generally, depending on the accident, different 
radionuclides might contaminate milk. The pro-
tective action to be taken to reduce the dose 
caused by consuming contaminated milk de-
pends on the radionuclides present. The most 
important nuclides and those considered also in 
this example are iodine and cesium. The follow-
ing protective actions can be considered: 
- banning of dairy milk 
- making butter and cheese 
- changing fodder for cows 
- using milk for animal fodder 
- using nuclide binders for cows 
- decontamination by ionexchange 
Only the first three actions can be taken in the 
early phase of the accident concerned their rapid 
implementation and the availability of the me-
thods for processing milk. 
The decision tree based on the above men-
tioned actions is shown in Figure B2. 
Figure B2. Decision tree for analysis of protective actions for contaminated milk. Actions marked with solid line 
are considered in the primary phase. 
Withdrawal of 
dairy milk from 
consumption 
Disposal I- -| Dried 
milk I 
I L 1 
Processing 
milk 
Butter 
Using milk for 
animal fodder 
Cheese 
1 Decontamination | 
by ionexchange 
Protective 
action(s) 
Decreasing the 
incorporation 
into food chain 
Changing fodder 
for cows 
- • [ Using nuclide 
binders for cowsl 
No-
action 
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In the decision of protective action the groups 
of adults, children and infants should be consid-
ered separately because of the large variation of 
the per capita consumption of milk and, thus, the 
individual dose. This can be done by breaking 
the dose attribute down into lower level attri-
butes of children and adults, and defining the 
actions feasible for the whole population. Or, at 
least in theory, by defining different protective 
actions for various groups, e.g. for adults and 
children. However, society is not neutral to the 
choice of action. In practice it is not easy to for-
mulate the action for one consumer group with-
out affecting the consumption of milk in an other 
group. Thus the actions in this example are de-
fined on a more generic basis as is presented in 
the decision tree (Figure B2). 
If dairy milk is withdrawn from consumption 
it is assumed in this example that it is all dis-
posed of as waste or processed to butter and/or 
cheese. 
If the contaminated area is small like Gotland 
it is also possible to change the fo^Jer for cows. 
The substitute for grazing or fresh fodder will be 
grain-based fodder which is assumed to be cl' in 
in the first year after the accident. A concenua-
tion level in milk comparable to that of the main-
land is thus easily obtained. 
The importance of considering separately the 
doses to children and adults is taken into account 
by breaking the dose attribute down into two 
lower level attributes of adults and children. In 
addition to these attributes, the cost of actions is 
defined as an attribute. The objective hierarchy 
is shown in Figure B3. 
In this example the measured average fallout 
level in Gotland is as follows: 
»?Cs 
i*Cs 
»il 
1.5 MBq/m2 
0.75 MBq/m2 
2.5 MBq/m2 
It is assumed that adults consume 0.71/d of milk 
on average and children 1.4 1/d. Based on the 
fallout levels of cesium and iodine the estimated 
individual dose (committed effective dose) accu-
mulated during one month and during the year 
following the accident will be as follows (mSv): 
month 
year 
1311 
1.6 
1.6 
»*»Cs 
1.5 
8.2 
J"Cs 
2.1 
13.9 
The doses calculated above are for adults. The 
dose caused by 137Cs in the first year corresponds 
to the mean concentration of 4500 Bq/I during 
this time period. The total individual dose 
caused by the above mentioned nuclides for 
adults is 5.2 mSv in a month and 23.7 mSv in a 
year, respectively. The calculated total doses for 
children (ten years old) are 15.8 mSv in a month 
and 52.8 mSv in a year, respectively. 
It is worth noticing that when considering two 
different timescales there are actually two ana-
lyses to be carried out. 
If dairy milk is withdrawn from consumption, 
disposed of and replaced by milk transported 
from the mainland, the doses will be one tenth of 
the value mentioned above. In addition to the 
losses of the production price, 3 SEK/1, the cost 
of disposing of the milk is assumed to be 20 SEK 
per 1000 1 of milk and the transportation costs 
200 SEK/10001 of milk (Tables BIV and BV). 
Figure B3. The hierarchy of objectives. 
Overall goal 
Costs Dose 
Adults 
1 
Children 
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Table BIV. The collective dose in various actions 
(manSv). 
Action Adults Children 
Month Year Month Year 
Disposal of 
dairy milk 24 109 15.8 53 
Butter/cheese 33 162 17 5 64 
Clean fodder 24 109 15 8 53 
No-action 240 1090 158 530 
Table BV. The costs of the various actions (million 
SEK). 
Action Month Year 
Disposal of 
dairy milk 5 4 65 
Butter/cheese 0.37 4.4 
Clean fodder 1.7 20 
No-action 0 0 
As a protective action it is also assumed that all 
the milk produced at Gotland can be processed to 
butter and cheese. During the process iodine will 
be removed by 99% when making butter and by 
89.3% when making cheese. Cesium will be re-
moved by 99.2% when making butter and by 94% 
when making cheese. Only cesium is important 
in these products and it is estimated that, on 
average, the cesium concentration is reduced by a 
factor of 0.04. Because the consumers of butter 
and cheese are not identifiable the dose is mea-
sured as a collective dose. The collective dose 
caused by butter and cheese is predicted to be 
11.7 manSv in a month and 71 manSv in the first 
year and is assumed to distribute evenly between 
the various age groups. The dose caused by the 
dairy milk transported from the mainland is also 
added to the collective dose in Table BIV. 
The extra costs when making butter and 
cheese are the transportation costs of dairy milk, 
200 SEK/1000 1 and disposal of costs of skimmed 
milk and milk whey, 20 SEK/1000 1. It is as-
sumed that there are no extra production costs 
when changing to the production of butter and 
cheese at Gotland. 
By changing fodder for cows it is assumed that 
the concentration of milk can be reduced to the 
same level as in the mainland. It is also assumed 
that there are enough resources for changing the 
Risø-R-641(EN) 
fodder. The cost of this action is assumed to in-
crease the product price by one SEK/1. 
Based on the range of figures given in tables 
BIV and BV the scale of the dose attribute chosen 
is 20 - BOO manSv for adults and 10 - 200 manSv 
for children in a month, and 100 - 1100 manSv 
for adults and 50 - 600 manSv for children in a 
year. The scale of the costs attribute is 0 - 6 mil-
lion SEK in a month and 0 - 70 million SEK in a 
year. In this example the values of attributes are 
converted to common units by linear utility 
functions. 
The central trade-off value between an adults' 
dose and the costs is coherent with the examples 
above set to 140 000 SEK/manSv. The trade-off 
value between adults' dose and childrens dose is 
defined so that one children manSv is twice as 
important as one adult manSv. 
The mathematical part of the analysis was per-
formed by a computer and results are given be-
low. The calculated utilities of various actions are 
given in Table BVI. 
All protective actions as well as their combina-
tions are justified in the first month and year 
after the accident. The most preferred actions, 
making butter and/or cheese and changing fod-
der for cows should be implemented in the first 
hand so extensively as possible. The actions ana-
lyzed here are not intended to be implemented at 
the same time i.e. changing fodder and making 
butter simultaneously, but as alternatives. 
At the beginning of this example it was as-
sumed that the population will accept the butter 
and cheese made from contaminated milk. The 
evidence accumulated during the Chernobyl ac-
cident indicates that foodstuffs whose concentra-
tion is ten times higher and which are produced 
in a contaminated area are not accepted by the 
population. Therefore the action of making but-
ter and/or cheese is not feasible in practice and it 
is not considered in deriving the intervention 
level. 
Table BVI. The calculated utilities of various ac-
tions. 
Action 
Butter/cheese 
Clean fodder 
Disposal of 
dairy milk 
No-action 
Month 
096 
0.96 
092 
0.27 
Year 
0.95 
0.94 
0.82 
0.25 
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The sensitivity analysis performed shows that 
the ranking of actions does not change within the 
range of the trade-off value or with risk prone 
utility functions. The action 'changing fodder' 
for cows is a truly preferred action. Even if the 
fallout level is predicted to be twenty times lower 
in Gotland and in the mainland than was as-
sumed in the example, the action 'clean fodder' is 
still justified during the first month. During the 
first year after the accident none of the analyzed 
protective actions are justified (except making 
butter/cheese). Disposal of dairy milk is never an 
optimal action. 
The intervention level is assessed by lowering 
Conclusion 
The aim of this annex has been to demonstrate 
how multi-attribute utility analysis can be ap-
plied when planning protective actions. The ac-
tions analyzed are generic and thus not very ap-
propriate for a full analysis of intervention levels. 
Also the data available in many cases are only 
indicative, especially those of non-radiological 
character. However, some general remarks can be 
concluded. 
In the primary phase it was predicted that the 
projected average individual dose to people stay-
ing outdoors during the IS hours' plume passage 
would be 1.85 mSv. It was also assumed that the 
dose averted is proportional to the time spent 
indoors. However, if the recommendation to 
shelter is given, sheltering will be slightly more 
effective than just staying indoors. Sheltering 
will also bring a relief of stress (which is not 
modeled in this example) or, at least, gaining the 
feeling of care. Neither is the decision maker's 
worry about the high doses of people staying out-
doors modeled. Taking these factors into account 
creates the need to restructure the problem. By 
including these factors in the analysis we might 
the contamination level so that the break-even 
point is reached. The intervention level, given as 
the mean concentration of 1J7Cs> is 350 Bq/1 dur-
ing the first year after the accident. The interven-
tion level is 200 Bq/1 in the first month after the 
accident given as the mean concentration of 137Cs 
during the first month. The lower intervention 
level during the first month is due to a dose 
mainly caused by iodine. The range of the inter-
vention level corresponding to the range of the 
trade-off value is 20 - 2000 Bq/1 in the first year, 
and 10 -1000 Bq/1 in the first month. If the dispo-
sal of milk is the only feasible action the derived 
intervention level is 1000 Bq/1. 
be near the break-even point, and thus the inter-
vention level for sheltering the whole population 
will be about 2 mSv accumulated during 15 hours 
corresponding to an outside dosemeter reading. 
In the secondary phase sheltering and evacua-
tion are not justified. The assessed intervention 
level for short term evacuation is 80 mSv accu-
mulated during 14 days. The range of the inter-
vention level is 4 - 400 mSv, corresponding to the 
range of the trade-off value between dose and 
cost. 
The intervention level for protective actions 
concerning milk depends on the time and scale 
of the accident and thus on the resources. The 
derived intervention level is assessed by chan-
ging the contamination level so low that the 
break-even point is reached and the ranking of 
'clean fodder' and 'no-action' is changed. The 
intervention level corresponding to the predicted 
mean concentration of 137Cs is 350 Bq/1 in the 
first year, and 200 Bq/1 in the first month after 
die accident. The range of intervention level is 
20 -2000 Bq/1 and 10 • 1000 Bq/1, correspondingly. 
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Abstract (Max. 2000 characters) 
This report is a part of the Nordic BER-3 pro-
ject's work to propose and harmonize Nordic in-
tervention levels for countermeasures in case of 
nuclear accidents. 
This report focuses on the methodology for 
justification and optimization of protective mea-
sures in case of a reactor accident situation with a 
large release of fission products to the environ-
ment. 
The down-wind situation is very complicated. 
The dose to the exposed society is almost unpre-
dictable. The task of the radiation protection ex-
perts: To give advice to the decision makers on 
averted doses by the different actions at hand in 
the situation - is complicated. That of the deci-
sion makers is certainly more: On half of the 
society they represent, they must decide if they 
wish to follow the advices from their radiation 
protection experts or if they wish to add further 
arguments - economical or political (or personal) 
• into their considerations before their decisions 
are taken. 
Two analysis methods available for handling 
such situations: cost-benefit analysis and mul* 
ti-attribute utility analysis are described in prin-
ciple and are utilized in a case study: The im-
pacts of a Chernobyl-like accident on the Swed-
ish island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea are ana-
lyzed with regard to the acute consequences. 
The use of the intervention principles found in 
international guidance (IAEA 91, ICRP 91), 
which can be summarized as the principles of 
justification, optimization and avoidance of un-
acceptable doses, are described. 
How to handle more intangible factors of a 
psychological or political character is indicated. 
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